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On  August 8. 1982 a leaflet was distributed in  The government's actions should be seen in
the Suq Al Manakh building and in the basement  the context of its desire to maintain social
of Commercial Center No. 5, the offices of the  harmony in a small, closely knit society during
parallel stock market and the Kuwait Stock  the protracted Iran-Iraq war.  Accordingly,
Exchange. The leaflet carried the names of most  officials pursued a policy to sidestep commercial
of the dealers in the stock market and it declared  regulations and bankruptcy law in the interest of
a one-month moratorium on all payments of  settling outstanding claims as quickly as pos-
maturing future cheques.  The moratorium,  sible.
informal as it was, was respected by the dealers.
By that time, close to a month had passed since  While asset prices continued to fall under
the first major default, and backlogs in payments  the impetus of government intervention, the
had brought the accepted form of clearing to a  decline was reinforced by political and eco-
halt.  The moratorium also marked the beginning  nomic shocks that affected domestic growth.
of a financial crisis that would absorb the  The sharp drop in oil prices and production
country's  full attention.  cutbacks led to lower govemment revenues,
reducing the  level of public spending programs.
During the next two years stock market and  At the same time, the continuation of I'  , Iran-
real estate prices fell more than 50 percent,  Iraq war and the recession in the oil-dependent
devastating investors who had bought the  Gulf countries reduced nonoil trade and damp-
underlying assets at future prices that were  ened economic expectations.
multiples of the current market value.  Because
these equities had been bought with postdated  This paper traces the development of
cheques-the  acceptable form of payment in  Kuwait's financial crisis and describes the
future transactions-buyers  and sellers found  interventions devised by the government as
themselves unable to settle their accounts and  events unfolded.  The critical question is
the government was forced to intervene.  whether the solutions will reignite Kuwait's
nonoil economy and stimulate the participation
of the private sector.
This paper is a product of the Office of the Executive Directors. Copies are available
free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please
contact Rafia Simaan, room El 127, extension 72167 (52 pages  with charts and
tables).
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CHRONOLOGY  OF THE  KUWAITI  FINANCIAL  CRISIS
March-August  '82  :  "Suq  Al-Manakh'  parallel  market  index  falls  from
240  to 110.
August  '82  Share  dealers  declare  moratorium  on  postdated
cheque  settlements.
September  '82  Law requires  registration  of postdated  cheques
with  clearing  company. Arbitration  Panels
formed  to settle  disputes.
October  '82  Value  of cheques  registered  at  US$90  billion.
November  '82  Creditor-Guarantee  Fund  capitalized  at  KD 500
million  formed  to  guarantee  up to  KD 2
million  per individual  against  dealers  in
banikruptcy.
December  '82  Chamber  of  Commerce  recommendation  to  bring  down
cheque  values  is  rejected  by  government.
January-March  '83  Clearing  process  begins. Government  begins
purchasing  Kuwaiti  stock  exchange  company
shares  at support  prices.
April '83  Settlement  organizatiun  for  futu-res  transactions
in  shares  setup  to  manage  bankruptcy,
liquidation,  and  settlement  of distressed
dealers.
August  '83  Law  brings  down  cheque  values  by limiting
premiums  and  authorizes  ArbitratIon  Panels
to  further  reduce  debt  on a case-by-case
basis.
August  '84  :  Kuwait  Stock  Exchange  established.
October-DGcember  '84:  Government  stops  share  support  program  resulting
in  sharp  break  in  Kuwaiti  stock  prices.
January-June  '85  Number  of irregular  loans  increases.
July '85  Government,  CBK  foxrially  announce  support  of
banking  system  and  depositors'  funds.
Study  of  Kuwaiti  and  Gulf  companies'  problems  in
progress.
November  '85  Restructuring  and  liquidation  of shareholding
companies  begins.-3-
October  '85  CBK  introduces  new  loan  classificatlon  and
provisioning  procedures.
August  '86  Difficult  Credit  Facilities  Settlement  Program
reschedules  borrowers  for  up to 15  years
with  no interest. CBK  supports  distressed
banks  by providing  deposits  at 1  percent.
1987-'88  Foreign  exchange  companies  registered  under  CBK
regulation.
July '88  Arbitration  Panel  and  settlements  organization
are  dissolved  and  replaced  by the  courts  and
the  Ministry  of Finance.
Creditor  Guarantee  Fund  increases  capital  by
KD 670  million.
October  '88  Planning  council  begins  review  of a medium-  to
long-term  economic  diversification  and
income  stabilization  study.-4-
THE  STOCK  hARKET
The  first  Kuwaiti  Shareholding  Company  (KSC)  was  formed  in 1952,
and  at the  time  of the  moratorium  there  were  40 publicly  owned  companies
listed  on the  Kuwait  stock  exchange. There  were  also  46  unlisted  Kuwaiti
shareholding  companies'  known  as KSCCs,  and  38  companies  established  in
Gulf  countries  that  traded  on the  informal  exchange  called  the
Suq  Al Manakh,  after  the  name  of the  building  in  which  most of the
brokers  had their  offices. The  companies  listed  on the  official  stock
exchange  were established  under  Kuwaiti  commercial  law  ./  ;  the  rest  were
traded  on the  unofficial  exchange  since  they  did  not  meet  the  exchange's
legal  requirements.
Kuwait's  securities  industry  was  regulated  by the  Committee  on
Securities  appointed  by the  Minister  of Commerce.  Although  the
committee  had  wide  powers  for  regulating  the  stock  market,  and  its
executive  board  met twice  a  month  to follow  market  developments,  there
were  no established  procedures  po supervise  the  system. Moreover,  the
committee  was limited  in its  supervision  to only  those  shares  registered
with it,  which  effectively  excluded  trades  in  the  parallel  market  that
accounted  for  more than  80  percent  of trading  volume. The  Securities  and
Investment  Department  of the  ministry  was  responsible  for  registering
trades,  supervising  brokers,  and  generally  executing  the  committee's
decisions.
Market  Expansion.  During  the  early  seventies,  surging  demand
for  equities  forced  prices  higher,  prompting  buyers  to  pay  a premium  for
newly  issued  shares,  even  while  companies  were  being  established. In
fact,  the  subscription  rights  of  Kuwaiti  citizens  could  be  bought  through
brokers,  and  almost  all the  companies  founded  were  oversubscribed.
Merchants  responded  to  shareholder  enthusiasm  by forming  new  companies  at
a rapid  pace,  assuring  themselves  of a certain  number  of shares  at  a
nominal  price. New issues  on the  stock  exchange  rose  from  KD 33 (Kuwaiti
dinars)  million  a  year in  1974  to  an annual  KD 165  million  between
1982-84  2/  .
This  growth  was  accompanied  by a rapid  rise  in  new  KSCCs  and
Gulf  companies  when the  government  suspended  the  formation  of  KSCs  for
almost  two  years,  from  mid-1977  to  mid-1979. Between  1976  and  1982,  38
Gulf-incorporated  companies  were  established  with  subscribed  capital  of
$3.5  billion  3/  . These  were  essentially  Kuwaiti-owned  but incorporated
in  the  Gulf  Emirates. Regulations  permitted  Kuwaiti  investors  to
incorporate  a company  in  any  Gulf  state. The firm  would  have  a long  list
of Gulf  founders  (although  most  were  Kuwaitis)  and  each  share  was
denominated  at 1/30  the  Kuwaiti  price  ($1  as  compared  to $30). Within  a
relatively  short  time  the  share  would  be actively  trading  in the  parallel
1/  See  Statistical  Appendix  8 and  9.
2/  See  Statistical  Appendix  8.
2/  Ibid.-5-
market. To the  Gulf states  these  were  essentially  offshore  companies
that  were  subject  to few  regulations  or reporting  requirements.  When  the
market  peaked  in 1982  the  equity  base  had  reached  $4.1  billion,  half of
which  had  been issued  in the  first  six  months  of the  year.
Following  the  expiration  of the  ban,  37  KSCCs  capitalized  at
$2  billion  A/ started  up,  and thess  too  began  trading  on the  parallel
market  despite  regulations  that  prohibited  founders  from  selling  shares
before  a three-year  period  of profitability.  To skirt  the  law,  letters
of sale,  rather  than  actual  shares,  were  given  to the  buyer. Depending
on how  many  times  the  shares  were  sold,  buyers  would  accumulate
sequential  letters  that  wculd  trace  the  sale  back  to the  founder. The
government  accelerated  the  process  during  the  boom  years  by reducing  the
maximum  subscription  amount  to  encourage  small  investors  to establish
firms,  and in  this  way, spread  the  benefits  of the  stock  market  boom.
New issues  between  1979-82  in  all  markets  totaled  close  to  KD 2.2
billion,  an increase  in outstanding  stocks  of 373  percent. In 1982  the
equity  of the  Gulf  companies  alone  exceeded  that  of the  listed  Kuwaiti
companies. The  equity  base  of the  entire  parallel  market  (including
KSCCs)  was  more  than  twice  that  of the  Kuwaiti  market  ._  .
The  Flrst  Market  Break.  In  late  1976  the  first  major  market
break  occurred;  the  annual  ir.dex  fell  18.7  percent,  from  235.2  to 191.8,
and  volume  dropped  66 percent. The  government  intervened  to avert  a
crisis  by suspending  the  establishment  of  new  shareholding  companies  and
increases  in the  capital  of existing  companies.  The rationale  was that
the  pace  of new  equity  issues  was  affecting  domestic  liquidity  and  had
contributed  to precipitating  the  crisis. The  government  stepped  in  to
support  the  market  by purchasing  shares  at a floor  price. From  December
1977  to  April  1978,  the  government  bought  about  KD 150  million  in shares.
The  Central  Bank  of  Kuwait  (CBK)  intervened  to address  possible
repercussions  to the  banking  system  by effectively  setting  up a
purchasing  facility  for  any  bad  debt  as a result  of bank  lending  to share
dealers  or against  security  of shares. The  facility,  however,  was  not
used  by any  bank. The  market  recovered  toward  the  end  of 1978  and  both
markets  remained  steady  until  1981,  when strong  bull  market  effectively
started. The  Kuwaiti  share  index moved  from  331  in  the  first  quarter  of
1981  to 523  in  the  second  quarter  of 1982  (see  figures  1 and  2).  The
Gulf index  moved  from  120  to  235  from  September  1981  to  March  1982  (see
figures  3  and  4).
i/  Ibid.
2/  See  Statistical  Appendix  8 and  9.-6
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Futures  Trading.  Prior to the crisis forward trading was very
informal. A government  ban  on such  trades  was  largely  ignored. Kuwaiti
merchants  were accustomed  to futures  trading  in commodities  and  real
estate,  but only  began  to  make  use  of the  method  to  buy shares  in  the
mid-seventies.  The seller  would  actually  deliver  shares  to  the  buyer  in
exchange  for  either  a postdated  cheque  or a promissory  note.  Futures
trading  played  a  very significant  technical  role  in  precipitating  the
crisis,  particularly  as dealers  had  to liquidate  share  positions  to  cover
maturing  payments  or their  overall  position  in  the  market. The  cheques
or notes  issued  were  also  often  discounted  with  the  banking  system,  with,
the  proceeds  used  to  make  payments  or purchase  shares.
In 1976  when  the  Stock  Market  Comm'ttee  was  orga  ized,  its
functions  included  regulating  the  futures  market,  but not  until  the  1977
crisis  did  the  government  pass  legislation  regulating  this  market  A/  .
The  law  required  all  futures  trades  to  be registered  with the  Securities
Administration  and  carry  a maximum  maturity  of 12 months. In  addition,
the  buyer  was required  to  pay the  seller  a  deposit  equivalent  to the
greater  of either  10  percent  of the  purchase  value  or the  difference
between  the  spot  and  future  prices. The  seller  retained  title  to the
shares  during  the  contract  period  unless  paid  in full  by the  buyer. But
traders  ignored  the  new  regulations  since  they  could  not  be implemented
without  a clearing  agent  to  monitor  the  deposit  required  as prices
changed  and  to guarantee  the  transfer  of title. Without  a clearing
intermediary,  individual  investors  continued  the  practice  of treating  the
sale  as a cash  transaction  except  that  the  payments  were  deferred. The
use  of cheques  was  also  very  practical  because  under  Kuwaiti  commercial
law  a cheque  is  a cash  instrument  payable  upon  presentation.  The  date  is
only  significant  in that  the  cheque  is  not  payable  if  the  date  is over  a
month  old. The future  date  of the  cheque  was, therefore,  not
significant,  and  what  merchants  accepted  was a  cash instrument  that  was
enforceable  by law  within  the  allotted  time. In  any  case,  except  for
registering  the  trade,  the  authorities  had  no  way to  supervise  the
agreement  between  buyers  and  sellers.
In 1981  the  futures  trading  laws  were  amended  to  require  a
contract  signed  through  a  broker  and  registered  with the  stock  exchange. 7/
The  contract  specified  the  maturLty,  the  underlying  shares  of the
transaction,  and  the  method  of  payment. This  registration  gave  a special
impetus  to futures  trading  in  a rapidly  rising  stock  market. The  buyer
and  seller  were  both  protected  by law,  so that  what  had  been  essentially
an instrument  for  merchants  who  knew  each  other  well  became  an instrument
determined  by price  and  the  reputation  of the  buyer. The  stock  exchange,
beside  registering  the  contract,  had  no role  in  regulating  the  clearing
mechanisms. The  brokers  ensured  that  that  buyer  delivered  his  cheque  and
the  seller  his shares  (after  transferring  title),  so the  trades  continued
to  be treated  as ;ash  trades. Traders  in the  fast-growing  parallel
market  were  completely  unregulated  at this  time.
i/  Kuwait  Stock  Exchange  No.  52,  1974;  61.  1976;  31,  1977. Laws,
Decrees.  and  Ministerial  R  esolutions.
Z/  Ibid. No.  90.  1981.-9-
By 1981  premiums  ia  the  Kuwaiti  stock  market  were  between  50  and
100  percent  and  double  that  in the  parallel  market  L/  Rather  than  take
the  risk,  many individual  and  institutional  investors  sold  the  shares
forward,  locking  in  a presumably  high  premium. Technically,  this  was  a
significant  development  for  the  futures  market. Previously  most  trading
was  between  dealers  who  could  clear  transactions  with  each  other,  but  the
entry  of a large  number  of '?sellers  onl)"  meant  that  the  dealers  would
have  large  open  and  unbalanced  positions.
A significant  number  of the  sellers  were  the  shareholding
companies. Of the  38  Gulf  companies,  28  dealt  in the  Kuwaiti  real  estate
and  stock  markets  through  limited  liability  subsidiaries  2/  . Loans  were
made to  the  subsidiary  and  the  subsidiary  invested  them  in  the  market.
These  companies,  with  a total  capital  of $2.5  billion,  had total
investments  in the  securities  market  worth  $2.8  billion  --  the  difference
funded  by borrowings.
A look  &t the  assets  of 33  nonbank  KSCs  demonstrates  the
financial  involvement  of Kuwaiti  companies  in  the  stock  market. Between
1980  aud  1982  these  firms  reported  a 92  percent  jump in  assets,  from
KD 1.5  billion  to  KD 3  billion. (Thirty-nine  percent  of the  growth  was
financed  from internal  resources  and  61  percent  with  short-  and  medium-
term  loans.) Profits  in 1981  and 1982  were  double  that  of 1980,  and  in
1984  and  1985  losses  were  an equivalent  amount  IQ/ . The  pattern
parallels  the  rise  and  fall  of the  stock  market.
Debtfo  onbanks  (KD  million)  IV
SECTOR  1980  11t  192A  198  1984  1985  1L98  1987
Industrial  116  129  118  179  164  128  113  102
Food  78  85  85  64  61  57  31  25
Service  & Transport  18  34  76  43  44  36  53  52
Real  Estate  151  217  358  317  297  241  186  192
Investment  567  922  1084  1240  1186  1124  942  1029
Insurance  76  91  LOO  105  109  92  93  89
TOTAL  100  1478  1iZ1  194  181  1678  L418  1L2
As an illustration  of the  diverse  KSCs  that  were  involved  in the
stock  market,  nine  of fourteen  industrial  companies  showed  exceptional
growth  in  external  funding,  receivables,  and  investments  from  1979  to
if  Al-Behlawi,  Haze;  and  Riad  Fahmi. The  Kuwaiti  Stock  Market
1946-1980.  The Industrial  Bank  of  Kuwait.  June 1982. P. 56.
2/ Securities  Group  SAK. Gulf  Companies  Direvtery. Kuwait. 1984.
1Q/ Based  on figures  from  the  Institute  of Banking  Studies.  Financial
Index  for  Kuwait  Stock  Exchange  Listed  ComDanies  80-86.  Kuwait.  1987.
/  Provided  by Al-Amwal.- 10  -
1982. A future  cheque  was  normally  accounted  for  either  as a receivable
or  if  the  accountant  was  imaginative,  as  an  operating  asset.  While  the
nine  companies  invested  close  to  KD  176  million  in  the  market,  bank
lending  to  the  sector  increased  by  KD  102  million  ovet  the  same  period.
The  market  investments  constituted  more  than  a  third  of  these  companies,
assets.  Other  sectors,  such  as  food  and  services,  invested  24  percent,
the  transport  sector  about  40  percent,  and  real  estate  firms  26  percent
of  their  assets  in  the  market.
In  1982  a  sharp  break  in  the  parallel  market  plunged  the  index
from  240  in  March  to  abou.  110  in  August,  making  it  difficult,  if  not
impossible,  for  dealers  to  liquidate  shares  in  exchange  for  cash. The
Kuwaiti  market  only  fell  6.5  percent  in  the  same  period,  primarily
because  of  the  government  share  purchase  program.  In  September
outstanding  postdated  cheques  totaled  $94  billion.  of  which  $78  billion,
or  83  percent,  related  to  transactions  in  Gulf  and  KSCC  shares.
TOWARD  A SOLUTION
Kuwait's  small  merchant  community  was  aware  that  prices  were
increasing  too  rapidly,  and  on  several  occasions  called  for  closer
government  supervision  of  the  markets.  One  such  occasion  was  a  Chamber
of  Commerce  conference  in  November  1981. It  was  clear  from  the  papers
presented  JV  that  there  were  serious  issues  to  o.e  addressed:  first,  the
role  of  futures  trading  in  determining  prices;  second.  tb'*  lack  of
information  on  the  size  of  outstanding  futures  cheques;  and  third,  the
supervision,  control,  and  development  of  the  Kuwaiti  stock  market  and  the
parallel  stock  markets.  At  the  time,  however,  there  was  no  problem.
Prices  of  securities  and  real  estate  were  high. The  'wealth'  effect
spilled  over  into  excellent  sales  for  everything,  from  new  homes  to
jewelry.  The  large  futures  trades  that  were  discussed  were  mainly
between  the  20  largest  dealers,  and  they  were  said  to  clear  most  of  thelr
purchases  and  sales  between  themselves.  The  government  had  already
implemented  new  regulations  for  the  Kuwaiti  market  and  issued  stiff
warnings  on  dealing  in  the  parallel  markets,  explicitly  stating  that
transferring  titles  of  KSCC  shares  was  illegal.
The  problem  was  that  even  in  the  parallel  market  dealers  issued
cheques  against  Kuwaiti  banks.  These  cheques  kept  accumulating  since
there  was  no  clearing  system.  Dealers  could  not  offset  purchases  with
sales  so  that  even  though  the  dealers  were  heavily  linked  to  each  other,
there  was  no  institution  to  net  their  positions.  While  the  market
demonstrated  a  tremendous  need  for  this  service,  it  was  difficult  for
institutions  to  get  involved  for  two  reasons:  first,  the  cheques
originated  mostly  frjm  transactions  that  were  illegal  (KSCCs)  or  not  in
the  jurisdiction  of  Kuwaiti  courts  (Gulf);  and  second,  the  cheques  were
not  issued  under  the  supervision  of  a  regulatory  body,  particularly  with
respect  to  credit  and  market  risk,  so  that  offsetting  credits  and  debits
would  involve  risks  beyond  the  normal  clearing  functions.
12/  Kuwait  Chamber  of  Commerce.  Develogment  of  the  Kuwaiti  Securities
Harknt.  (Proceedings  of  the  conference).  1981.- 11  -
In  mid-1981  a  private  investment  company,  International  Finance
Advisors  (IFA),  began  work  on a clearing  system. And in  April  1982  IFA
first  approached  the  dealers. The  company  would  clear  cheques  maturing
every  15 days  on two  fixed  settlement  dates  each  month. Cheques  up to
six  months  maturity  would  be deposited  with trhe  system. Within  a  month,
60  dealers,  who  handled  more  than  half  the  market's  volume,  joined  the
system. Because  those  dealers  had  cheques  for  and  against  them  from
dealers  outside  the  system,  it  was finally  possible  to  arrive  at the
positions  of  most  dealers  Ij  .
Toward  late  June information  on the  amount  of  outstanding
cheques  and  the  dealers'  future  positions  was available. IFA  estimated
that  cheques  with  a nominal  value  of  KD I  billion  matured  every  month,
for  an expected  net  of  KD 200  million. Of this  amount,  KD 150  million
was  estimated  to  be normal  deficits  and  surpluses,  that  is,  dealers  with
net  overbought  in  one  month  could  cover  either  with  net  oversolJd  in
another. The remaining  KD 50  million  represented  net  overall  overbought
positions,  mainly  in  the  parallel  market. These  dealers  had  bought  at
very  high  premiums  and  had  insufficient  assets.
Prior  to  a netting-out  system,  the  full  KD 1  billion  had to
change  hands  in  cash,  which  meant  that  dealers  had  to liquidate
substantial  amounts  of shares. If a  dealer  had to  pay  KD 100  million  in
the  first  15 days,  even  though  he  had  KD 98  million  coming  in in the  next
15  days.  he would  have  to liquidate  RD 100  million  in shares  without  a
clearing  system. With  a  clearing  system  he  would  only  need  KD 2  million
in  cash.
The  clearing  problem  was  how to  handle  the  net  payout  from  the
dealers  of  KD 100  million  a month  that  required  liquidating  assets. The
remaining  KD 100  million  a  month  could  be  handled  within  the  system  by
moving  balances  from  one  dealer  in  surplus  for  a settlement  period  to
another  dealer  in  deficit  for  the  same  settlement  period  --  assuming  that
prices  of securities  and  property  held firm. And,  how  was the  system  to
handle  the  chronic  deficits  that  were  not  backed  with  good  assets,  if
any?  ,*
Government  Interventlon.  When the information  was relayed
related  to the  accing  Minister  of Finance  and  the  Minister  of Commerce,
the  immediate  priority  was to  avoid  a liquidity  crisis,  since  by this
time  the  first  default  of a  major  dealer  was  already  causing  delays  for
other  dealers. The  Minister  of Finance  asked  IFA  to  meet  with  the  banks
and  the  investment  companies  to  discuss  possible  bridge  financing
requirements /  . It  became  clear  after  a  number  of  meetings  that  the
financial  institutions  would  not  be able  to  meet  funding  requirements  of
almost  KD 100  millioft  a  month. In fact,  they  were  not  sure  that  this  was
the  best  approach  si 7 nce  the  dealers'  financial  positions  were  unknown.
And  because  the  dealers  were  heavily  linked,  it  was  difficult  if  not
impossible  to tell  which  dealers  were illiquid  and  which  were  insolvent.
l/  Based  on files  from  International  Financial  Advisors  KSC. Kuwait.
JA/ The  author  served  as  chairman  of IFA.- 12 -
By the  end  of  July it  was  clear  that  the  government  would  have to
intervene.  The  dealers'  moratorium  in  August  was  useful  in that  it  gave
the  government  time  to  bring  out  the  first  of a  series  of laws.
To determine  the  size  of the  problem,  on September  20,  the
government  passed  a law  requiring  investors  to  register  all  cheques  for
stock-related  transactions  1/  . The  law  specified  that  the  Council  of
Ministers  would  set  up one  or  more  arbitration  panels  (A  Panels)  of five
members  each  to  look  into  claims,  including  those  that  were  being
processed  by the  civil  courts  I/  .
The  A Panel  was  established  for  one  year,  subject  to renewal.
The  panel's  decisions  were final  and  not  subject  to  appeal,  and  were to
be guided  by 'commercial  practice'  and 'national  economic  interest.'  The
panel  could  determine  the  form  of  payment  and  could  nullify  transactions
and  cancel  contracts. The  decisions  would  be implemented  by the
executive  authorities.  But  the  panel  had  no power  to  bring  down the
value  of the  payments,  although  the  law  did  allow  the  council  of
ministers  to  decide  on the  value  of the  premium  over  the  spot  prices.
The  powers  also  included  attaching  assets. Settlement  among  dealers  was
permitted,  provided  that  the  settlements  did  not  affect  third  parties;
that  is,  all  creditors  were to receive  proportional  amounts,  and the  A
Panel  was to  be informed.
On  November  22  the  National  Assembly  approved  a second  law  that
embodied  many  of the  principles  of the  first  law  but  included  some
extremely  important  additions:  1V/
(1)  Cheques  that  did  not  have  an  underlying  stock  transaction
would  be referred  to the  courts  for  a decision  on fair
compensation.
In  other  words,  the  legislators  recognized  that  the
cheques  were inflated  and  gave  the  courts  the  power  to
bring  down  the  face  value. The  cheque  in this  case  was
considered  a 'debt'  rather  than  a 'cash'  i.kstrument  1J.
(2)  The  A Panel  would  refer  dealers  unable  to  meet their
payments  to  the  attorney  general  for  bankruptcy
procedures.
The  A Panel's  powers  were  restricted  to  negotiating
disputes  rather  than  resolving  issues,  whether  it  was
jV  Kuwait  Ministry  of Commerce. Law  No.  57.  1982.
]5/  Only  one  A Panel  was  established,  although  its  members  eventually
divided  up the  number  of cases  and  split  into  two  groups.
LV/  Kuwait  Ministry  of Commerce. Law  No.  59.  1982.
.2/  Nasr,  Zakaria. Al-Manakh  Crisis  and the  Development  of the  Kuwait
Stock  Market. Kuwait. August  1984.- 13 -
D3Lnging  down  the  value  of one  cheque  or determining  what
was  a fair  payment  for  a  distressed  dealer.
(3)  The law  provided  five  years  in  jail  for  punishment  of
dealers  who  were  not  able  to  meet  payments  and  had
undisclosed  assets.
(4)  The  A Panel  was extended  to two  years  and it  was  required
to ratify  all  settlements.
(5)  A creditor  guarantee  fund  was  established  in the  Ministry
of Finance  to  guarantee  the  creditors  in  a bankruptcy
proceeding.  Claims  were  guaranteed  for  the  full  value  of
the  cost  of the  shares  and  any  premium  agreed  to (up  to
the  date  of the  law). The  cost  was  arrived  at  using  the
spot  share  price  on the  date  of the  transaction.  The fund
charged  1  percent  of the  value  of all  registered  cheques.
The  payout  from  the  fund  was as follows:
(1) Amounts  up to  KD 100,000  would  be fully  compensated  in
cash.
(2)  From  KD 200,000-250,000  in  bonds  maturing  in  one  year.
(3)  From  KD 250,000-500,000  in  bonds  maturing  in two  years.
(4)  From  KD 500,000-750,000  in  bonds  maturing  in three  years.
(5)  From  KD 750,000-1  million  in  bonds  maturing  in four-and-a-
half  years.
(6)  From  KD 1  million-1.5  miliion  in  bonds  maturing  in  five-
and-a-half  years.
(7)  From  KD 1  million-2  million  in  bonds  maturing  in  six  years.
A creditor  was  guaranteed  up to  KD 2 million  in  claims. The  law
was  adjusted  a  year later  to limit  total  claims  to  KD 0.5  million.
The  fund  was  criticized  as  over-generous  since  in  many  cases  the
spot  share  price  did  not  represent  the  real  cost. Founders  of companies
in  particular  had  paid  only  a fraction  of  what  the  fund  guaranteed.  The
total  claims  guaranteed  for  each  creditor  were  also  high.  The  National
Assembly  made  the  decision  on the  grounds  that  the  fund  would  eliminate
most  of the  small  dellers  from  the  settlement  process.
The  cheques  were  registered  with  the  Kuwait  Clearing  Company,  a
newly  established  entity  owned  by the  banks  and  the  three  public
investment  companies. Figures  finally  became  available  and  they  showed
6,188  individuals  with  cheques  valued  at  KD 26.7  billion. Of these,
5,120  (if  they  were  payers  and  receivers)  would  have a surplus  and  1,068
would  have a  deficit. Forty-nine  percent  of the  net receivers  had  net
surplus  positions  of up to  KD 100,000  and  ninety  percent  of  up to
KD 2 million;  the  net  deficit  position  amounted  to KD 7.5  billion.-14  -
A number  of technical  and  legal  questions  remained  to  be
answered,  including  these:
- Would  the  council  of  ministers  lower  the  premiums?
- How  would  the  clearing  system  operate?
- How would the A Panel proceed?
- How  would  assets  be liquidated  to  meet  payments?
The  Chamber  of  Commerce Approach.  The  Chamber  of Commerce,
which  has traditionally  been  a powerful  lobby  for  the  merchant  community,
came  up with its  own  solution  a  month  later  12/ . Essentially,  the
proposal  suggested  reducing  the  premiums  to a  minimum  of 25 percent  and  a
maximum  of 50  percent;  delaying  by six  months  all  maturities  with an
interest  of 12  percent;  and  giving  the  dealers  government  assistance  with
financing. The  Chamber  suggested  that  all  dealers  submit  their  financial
statements  and  clear  accounts  between  each  other  to  show  their  net
positions. Dealers  unable  to  meet-payments  could  file  for  amicable
settlement  under  the  bankruptcy  proceedings.
Chamber  officials  and  dealers  were  surprised  when the  Kuwait
Clearing  Company  announced  on  behalf  of the  Minister  of Finance  that  all
dealers  were to  authorize  the  company  to  perform  clearing  operations  on
their  behalf  on a quarterly  basis,  at  which  time  deficit  dealers  would  be
expected  to settle  their  quarterly  positions.  The  accounts  would  be
calculated  on the  full  value  of the  outstanding  cheques,  without  the
reductions  in  premiums  recommended  by the  Chamber  of Commerce. Those
dealers  that  did  not  wish  to authorize  the  company  were  free  to  withdraw
their  cheques  from  the  system  after  paying  the  1  percent  fee  to the
creditor's  fund. The  government  began  to  purchase  Kuwaiti  companies'
shares  at announced  prices  during  1983. The  intention  at that  time
seemed  to  be that  with  a sufficient  injection  of liquidity,  share  prices
would  recover  to  make  clearing  possible.
According  to  observers  there  were  a number  of risks  in the
government's  plan,  but  having  pursued  a legal  anproach,  there  were few
alternatives  available. Government  policymakers  should  have required  all
dealers  with  claims  against  them  to  submit  financial  statements  or a  bank
guarantee  equivalent  to the  amount  of their  liability. The  clearing
company,  however,  was  no;  authorized  to require  liability  statements
without  the  approval  of the  A Panel. The  A Panel  could  ask  for  accounts,
and  in  fact,  did  ask all  deficit  dealers  to  present  their  accounts.
Where  there  were real  deficits,  dealers  were  asked  to  reach  amicable
settlements  with  credLtors  in  a  specified  period.  Surplus  dealers  and
those  deficit  dealeris  that  were  able  to  balance  their  positions  were  not
required  to  submit  statements  if  there  was  no  dispute.
12/  Kuwait  Chamber  of  Commerce.  Solution  to the  Stock  Market  and  Future
Cheques  Crisis. Kuwait. December  15,  1982.- 15 -
The real  problem  was  that  the  accounts  showed  cheques  at their
face  values  when it  was  evident  that  there  was  a large  real  deficit  in
the  system. Not  only  was it impossible  to  tell  the  clients'  true
position,  but if  some  dealers  were  forced  into  bankruptcy  their  deficits
would  imperil  other  dealers  because  of the  heavy  linkages. In fact,  by
December,  the  A Panel  had  already  referred  nine  dealers  to  bankruptcy
proceedings.  Their  deficits  with  the  clearing  company  were
KD 4.3  billion  2_/  . After  a generous  valuation  of their  assets,  the
dealers  were estimated  to  have  a net  deficit  of  KD 3.4  billion. Both  the
existing  deficits  in the  system  and  the  rapid  deterioration  in  asset
prices  made it  difficult  to assure  that  third  parties  were  not  adversely
affected. Creditors  who  settled  their  disputes  first  received  larger
payouts  and  higher  quality  assets.
A second  problem  with  the  legal  approach  was  handling  the  flow
of assets  from  net  payers  to  net  receivers.  The  clearing  company's
figures  showed  that  83  percent  of the  registered  trades  covered
transactions  in  Gulf  companies  and  KSCCs,  whose  shares  which  were  not
supported  by the  government  and  could  not  be placed  as security  against  a
loan. The  cheque-by-cheque  approach  meant  that  assets  had to  physically
change  hands,  and  since  receivables  and  payables  could  not  be matched
under  the  system,  assets  had  to  be liquidated  in  an already  thin  Kuwaiti
market  and  a rapidly  falling  parallel  market. The  clearing  company  could
not  perform  multilateral  clearing  operations  on cheques  whose  real  values
were  not  known  and  whose  values  changed  as the  market  declined. The
links  between  dealers  meant  that  as the  value  of a  cheque  changed,  it
would  work through  the  system  to affect  other  dealers.
Third,  the  approach  did  not solve  the  problems  of the  large
dealers  in  deficit. Bankruptcy  proceedings  at  best  would  take  years.
This  meant  that  most  payments  would  effectively  come  to  a stop  since  no
payments  could  be made  by the  large  dealers,  and  all  the  dealers  in the
network  would  be unable  to  meet  their  commitments.
A COMPREHENSIVE  SOLUTION?
It  was  not  surprising  that  these  risks  were not  addressed  either
by the  Chamber  or the  government.  They  could  not  be addressed  because
the  decision  had  been  made to  route  the  cases  through  the  courts. The
legislators  disapproved  of the  dealers,  whom they  saw  as speculators
whose  risky  activities  had  upset  the  financial  system  and  who  deserved  to
be punished. The  laws  reflected  this  objective.  While  alternatives  were
presented  they  were  not  politically  acceptable.
The  Clearln4  Solutlon.  A  satisfactory  response  could  have  been
based  on simplifying  asset  movements  between  dealers  through  the  clearing
company. The  basic  assumption  was that  the  cheques  were  only  worth  the
value  of the  dealers'  underlying  assets  and  that  was  what final  receivers
would  get  regardless  of the  law.
.2&/  IFA  acted  as trustee  and  advisor  to  some  of the  dealers. The
information  is from  IFA  files.- 16 -
This  meant  that  asset  prices  would  have  been fixed  for  clearing
purposes  (for  both  Kuwaiti  and  Gulf  shares),  without  any  purchasing
mechanism. Dealers'  accounts  would  have  been  calculated  on the  same
basis  and  would  have included  all  claims  (including  those  not  related  to
stocks). The first  step  would  have  been to  determine  each  dealer's  net
worth  and  turn  it  over  to  the  clearing  system. All receivers,  whether
intermediary  or final,  would  have  been entitled  to the  same  value,  and  no
third  party  would  have  been  affected. Net  payers  would  turn  in  their
assets  to  an intermediary  and  net  receivers  would  then  have  claims  to
real  assets. The  clearing  company  would  have  effectively  unlinked  the
dealers  through  issuing  clearing  notes,  which  could  have  been  used  for
payments  within  the  system.
This  solution  faced  opposition  for  a  number  of reasons:
(1)  It  nullified  the  contract  between  the  buyer  and  seller
specifying  payment  of a  certain  sum. The laws  provided  for
a  reduction  in  the  premiums  according  to  recommendations  by
the  council  of  ministers.  The  Chamber  recommended  cuts  of
25 to 50  percent,  reflecting  the  strong  institutional
influence  of its  members. The 'clearing'  solution  would
treat  solvent  and  insolvent  individuals  and firms  according
to  their  ability  to  pay. The  basic  difference  was that
since  insolvent  firms  would  pay  less  than  the  amount  owed,
their  creditors  would  have  to  agree. No doubt  some  of the
procedures  could  have  been  tightened  to resemble
bankruptcy,  and in  fact  they  later  were  when the
settlements  organization  was  established.
Solvent  dealers  (loosely  defined)  put  pressure  on the
government  to  bring  down  the  premium. Under  the 'clearing'
solution  they  would  not  benefit  by the  deflation  in
payments  except  by the  extent  of their  net  worth. All
dealers  had the  option  of amicably  settling  their  debts,  as
many  later  did,  on  more favorable  terms. The  clearing,
solution  would  have  favored  receivers,  but  world  not  have
constituted  fair  compensation  for  dealers  and  merchants,
who in 'real'  terms  woule  pay  multiples  of the  amounts
contracted.
The legal  basis  for  bringing  down  the  premiums  was  not
viable  because  it  could  change  the  net  position  of the
dealers,  depending  on the  differences  in  premiums  and
maturities  between  assets  and  liabilities.  Dealers  in
surplus  could  find  themselves  in deficit,  and  vice  versa.
(2) The solution  would  have  required  fixing  the  prices  of
Kuwaiti  and  Gulf  shares. Delinking  the  dealers  by using
instruments  such  as clearing  notes  would  have  required  some
form  of government  or clearing  guarantee. Without  .a  clear
evaluation  of all  the  assets  that  could  end  up  with the
clearing  company,  the  government  would  have faced  an open.
ended  commitment. It  also  raised  issues  of  burdensharing
between  the  government  and  the  dealers  in  the  costs  of a
solution.- 17 -
(3)  Since  most  of the  expected  payments  would  be in the  form  of
assets  such  as shares  and  property,  there  would  be a
settlement  problem  for  those  receivers  that  had  sold  to
dealers  with good  assets. Why,  for  example,  should  they
accept  paper  from  the  clearing  company  when they  could  get
good  assets? The  A Panel  in its  judgments  too  would  need
to indicate  the  settlement  details. This  would  have  meant
that  good  assets  would  be directly  transferred  to final
receivers  while  bad  assets  would  be deposited  with the
clearing  company.
Dlstressed  Dealers.  The  situation  was  extremely  complex  and  the
only  way  to  avoid  affecting  third  parties  would  have  been  a  government
guarantee  of all  claims. Since  this  was  neither  possible  nor  desirable,
it  was  up to  the  A Panel  to  devise  a fair  resolution.  The  A Panel  used
its  powers  vigorously. In the  event  of a  dispute,  and  there  were  many,
the  distressed  debtors  were  asked  to  prepare  a settlement  program  for  all
creditors  and  show  how  payments  would  be handled. Distressed  debtors
with  many transactions  could  not effectively  prepare  a  program  since
creditors  would  not  willingly  accept  Gulf  or  Kuwaiti  shares  in lieu  of
cash. The  Guarantee  Fund  also  made  settlement  with  creditors  difficult,
since  creditors  with guarantees  had  no incentive  to settle  for  shares
from  the  debtors. In fact,  the  alter  nature  of a cash  settlement  by the
Fund  encouraged  bankruptcy  proceedings.  In the  case  of  dealers  with
better  assets  and  a small  number  of transactions,  the  A Panel  would  rule
on the  creditors'  assets  against  the  claim,  without  specifying  the  value
of the  assets,  and  in this  way, it  would  effectively  reduce  the  value  of
the  payment.
As the  A Panel  proceeded,  there  was a strong  need  to  process
bankruptcy  procedures  more  quickly,  particularly  since  installment
payments  depended  on  payments  from  the  large  dealers. On April  20, 1983
tne  Ministry  of Finance  established  the  Settlement  Organization  for
Futures  Transactions  to  handle  settlements,  liquidation,  and  bankruptcy
procedures  iL  . In effect  its  mandate  was to  manage  the 'bankruptcy'
function  without  the  disadvantages  associated  with  the  courts;  the
organization  was  also  given  the  authority  to settle  claims  amicably. The
creditors'  fund  represented  the  creditors  that  were  paid  out.  The
organization  was  also  authorized  to issue  negotiable  and  transferable
bonds  against  assets,  which  assisted  the  payments  process  for  other
debtors.
The  organization  issued  three  kinds  of  bonds  depending  on the
assets  held  by the  debtors,  the  first  against  cash  and  other  liquid
assets,  the  second  against  real  estate  and  KSC  shares,  and  the  third
against  Gulf  and  KSCC  shares. Payments  to  creditors  were  made  available
as the  assets  were liquidated  or sold  to  the  government  under  the
purchase  or restructuring  programs. Of 312  dealers  referred  to the
organization,  238  were  able  to  settle  amicably  with their  creditors  and
the  remaining  74  declared  bankruptcy.  The  distressed  dealers  had  claims
LI/  Kuwait  Chamber  of Commerce. Law  No.  75.  Kuwait. 1983.- 18  -
of KD 5.8  billion  against  those  inside  the  organization  and  received  an
average  29  percent  of their  claims 2/  -
In  August  a new  law  was  passed  incorporating  the  following
important  changes:  7/
(1) All  debt  related  to forward  shares  would  mature  on the  date
of effectiveness  of the  law.
(2) The  maximum  interest  rate  or  premium  would  be 25 percent.
(3) The  A Panel  was  given  the  right  to  reduce  the  premium.
(4)  Dealers  could  insist  on clearing  claims  against  other
dealers.
The  first  two  changes  affected  the  financial  position  of dealers
depending  on the  maturity  and  premium  profiles  of assets  and  liabilities.
Some  dealers  in surplus  changed  to deficit,  while  others  that  had  made
settlements  with their  creditors  on the  basis  of the  old  law  now  had to
renegotiate  receivables  that  were  reduced  in  value.  In  effect,  some
dealers  became  distressed  by law.
The  A Panel's  power  to reduce  the  premiums  was  helpful  but as
noted,  the  panels  had already  found  ways  to do this. The fourth  item  was
critical  for  dealers  that  were  linked,  and  allowed  dealers  to  offset  a
matured  obligation  to  a dealer  against  future  claims  on him.  Under  the
old law  the  A Panel  considered  the  first  dispute  and  waited  three  months
for  the  other  amounts.  Now dealers  could  insist  that  their  payments  be
made  with  claims  against  the  same  dealer,  possibly  with  some  discount  on
premium  for  maturity  differences.
THE BANKING  CRISIS
Toward  the  end  of 1984  as asset  prices  continued  to fall,  it
became  evident  that  the  banking  system  would  be affected;  how  severely
was  unclear. In  early  1985  when  bank  officials  had  the  information  to
assess  the  problem,  they  estimated  that  40  percent  of their  loan
portfolios  were  nonperforming.  In  October  the  Hinister  of Finance
announced  that  the  banking  system's  total  loans  amounted  to  KD 4.4
billion,  of  which  KD 1.5  billion  was  secured;  the  remaining  KD 3  billion
was  unsecured  and  the  possibilities  of collection  were  unknown. He added
that  some  debtors  might  pay  part  or all  of their  debts,  depending  on
their  assets  .
22/  Information  provided  by Settlements  Organization.
jV  Kuwait  Ministry  of Commerce. Law  No.  100. 1983.
Z/  Kuwait  News  Agency.- 19  -
The  central  bank  sought  ways  to strengthen  its  supervision  of
the  system  and  established  a framework  for  classifying  bark debts,
provisioning,  and  collateral.  As dealers  finished  with the  A Panels,
they  approached  the  banks  for  rescheduling.  The  magnitude  of the  fall  in
asset  prices  also  led  many  borrowers  whose  involvement  in  the  stock
market  was  minimal  to seek  rescheduling.  On  August  11,  1986  new
legislation  was  announced  to  alleviate  the  position  of the  banks. The
Difficult  Credit  Facilities  Settlement  Program  set  the  basic  guidelines
for  rescheduling  debt  and  outlined  the  principles  for  central  bank
support  of the  banking  system.
The  support  system  applied  to the  entire  financial  sector,  which
included  six  commercial  banks  and  four  speclalized  banks  --  the
Industrial  Bank,  the  Kuwait  Real  Estate  Bank,  the  Credit  Saving  Bank  and
the  Kuwait  Finance  House,  an Islamic  bank  2.  . There  were  also  three
listed  investment  companies  and  17  private  investment  companies  formed  as
KSCCs  that  speclalized  in  various  services,  such  as merchant  banking,
portfolio  management,  automobile  finance,  and  so  on.  The  assets  of the
banks  and  the  investment  companies  listed  on the  stock  exchange  formed
more  than  91  percent  of total  KSC  assets  and  close  to  63 percent  of the
equity  base  j  -
Effects  of  Growth.  During  the  oil  boom  the  commercial  banks
grew  rapidly. Total  assets  rose  534  percent  from  1973  to  1979. The
commercial  bank's  capital  and  reserves  in  the  same  period  increased  from
KD 45.5  million  to  KD 268.6  million,  or  by almost  590  percent  (although
since  Kuwait  follows  the  "hidden  reserves"  system,  these  figures
underestimate  the  true  reserve  position). Bank  lending  to the  private
sector  grew  eight  times,  from  KD 266  million  in 1973  to KD 2.1  billion  in
1979. An increasing  proportion  of  bank  lending  went  to the  financial
service  sector,  real  estate,  and  personal  loans.
With the  parallel  growth  in  government  expenditures,  the  private
sector  benefited  from  direct  flows  from  land  purchases  and  indirect  flows
from  development  expenditures.  During  1974-79  there  were two  important
changes  in the  banking  system's  loan  portfolios.  First,  a  high rate  of
growth  in lending  to  all  sectors;  and  second,  a shift  in the  share  of
loans  to the  service  sector  and  to individuals,  The  share  of trade  fell
from  31  percent  to  27.3  percent,  financial  services  rose  from  13.4
percent  to 21.9  percent construction  soared  from  2.3  percent  to 17.3
percent,  and  personal  loans  climbed  from  22  percent  to 27.1  percent.
These  changes  transformed  the  implicit  duration  of  bank loans  from  short-
term  trade  financing  to  medium-term  loans  for  equipment,  equity,  and  real
estate. The  banks  did  continue  overdraft  lending  methods  that  required
IV  Foreign  bank  branches  are  prohibited  from  operating  in  Kuwait
although  they  are  allowed  to  hold  minority  equity  in investment
companies,  except  for  the  Bahrain  Kuwait  Bank  which  is a  joint
venture  between  private  Bahraini  and  Kuwaiti  interests.
IV The figures  do not  include  the  Credit  and  Savings  Bank,  a government-
owned  bank  that  makes  low-interest  housing  and  social  loans,  the
Industrial  Bank,  or other  unlisted  investment  companies.- 20 -
annual  approval,  but they  moved  slowly  toward  loans  with  commitments
longer  than  a  year.  This  shift  to  term  lending  also  made the  banking
system  more  susceptible  to changes  in  government  expenditures  and  other
factors  as  lending  became  linked  to  services  and  the  prices  of assets.
The  structure  of bank  liabilities  also  changed  over  the  same
period,  with  an increasing  proportion  of  private  sector  claims  against
the  banks  taking  the  form  o-f  term  deposits. This  undoubtedly  increased
the  average  cost  of funds  to  the  banks  which,  on the  asset  side,
translated  into  floating  rate  loans,  best  suited  for  the  financial
sector. As banks  developed  their  treasury  departments  and  branch
networks,  Kuwaiti  depositors  became  increasingly  interest-sensitive  and
shopped  around  for  the  best rate. When foreign  currency  interest  rates
began  to  climb  toward  1977,  investors  moved  deposits  out  of demand  aaid
savings  accounts  to foreign  currencies.
A change  in  Kuwait's  interest  rate  structure  facilitated  these
shifts  in  assets  and  liabilities.  Interest  rates,  which  had  been  fixed
at  a maximum  7  percent,  were  loosened  in 1977  when the  law  was  amended
authorizing  the  central  bank  to  adjust  the  rates  from  time  to time. But
the  law  was  not  flexible  enough  to  allow  the  authorities  to  keep  pace
with  interest  rates  overseas  as they  approached  8 to 10 percent,  and
climbed  in 1978-79  to  between  15 and  18 percent.
For  instance,  interest  rates  in  1977  were 7  percent  on secured
one-year  loans  (for  productive  activities);  8.5  percenit  on unsecured
loans;  and  10  percent  on loans  of  more than  a year.  But  as interbank
deprsit  rates  rose  to  12  percent  in 1979,  banks  had  to shift  to  higher
yielding  assets  of longer  maturities.  The  yields  were in  fact  improved
by requiring  compensating  balances  and  charging  service  fees  to avoid
interest  rate  regulations.  The  offshore  banks,  most  of them  branches  of
international  banks,  which  were  not  bound  by Kuwait  regulations,  borrowed
Kuwaiti  dinars  to  on-lend  to  Kuwaiti  clients. In  some instances  the  cost
of interbank  overnight  funds  reached  30 to  40  percent.
To fund  the  growth  in  the  banking  system,  the  banks  almost
annually  increased  capital  either  by capitalizing  earnings  in the  form  of
bonus  shares  (at  no  cost to  shareholders)  or  by issuing  new  shares  and
charging  a premium  over  the  nominal  price  (but  below  the  market  price).  27/
With  active  trading  and  a steady  increase  in  stock  prices,  the  banks  had
no  problem  raising  equity  except  in 1977-78,  when  no new  companies  or new
share  issues  were  permitted  (although  some  banks9  issued  bonus  shares
during  this  period). The  change  of the  banks'  liabilities  and their  need
for  more  capital  also  made them  susceptible  to foreign  interest  rates,
exchange  rates,  and  stock  market  activity.
From  1979  to 1982  bank  assets  grew  95  percent,  from  KD 3.8
billion  to  KD 7.4billion,  while  claims  against  the  private  sector
advanced  102  percent. Except  for  agriculture  and fisheries,  growth  was
strong  in  all  sectors,  with some  further  shift  toward  financial  services,
teal  estate,  and  personal  loans. As term  lending  increased,  loans  became
2/  See  Statistical  Appendix  6.21 -
more  concentrated  in  terms  of the  number  of companies  and individuals
that  could  borrow  fixed-term  funds  at Uloating  interest  rates  2  . It
required  an awareness  of the  market  and  management  skills  that  only  the
larger  companies  and  merchants  had.  It is  important  to  note  that  while
the  banks  would  lend  to a  company  in the  financial  sector,  for  example,
such  loans  could  be used  to invest  in,  or lend  to,  real  estate. As noted
earlier  some  Gulf  and  Kuwaiti  companies  were  heavily  involved  in the
stock  market.
End  of the  Boom. A number  of factors  precipitated  the  decision
to intervene  but there  was  no run  on the  banks  on any  other  "panic"  that
stopped  operations.  But  by 1984  the  banks  were  encountering  an alarming
increase  in irregular  debt.  Borrowers  were increasingly  unable  to  pay
the  interest  or  principal  due  on loans  because  there  was a shortage  of
liquidity  among  clients  involved  in  the  stock  market. This  was  a natural
evolution  of the  settlement  system  followed  by the  A Panel. The  cheque
by cheque  clearing  system  was  a slow  process. The  increasing  number  of
"distressed'  borrowers,  whether  illiquid  or insolvent,  were
simultaneously  trying  to liquidate  assets,  "clogging"  the  clearing
process. This  made  it  difficult  for  dealers  to  know  not  only  how  much
each receivable  was worth but also in what kind of assets --  and when --
they  would  be paid.  For  the  banks  it  became  increasingly  difficult  to
assess  a  borrower's  financial  position  and,  in  particular,  to
differentiate  between  illiquid  and  insolvent  borrowers.
When  the  government  stopped  its  share  support  purchases  toward
the  end  of 1984,  there  was  no market  for  sellers  to turn  to.  Under  the
support  system,  there  were  market  prices  for  most  shares  at discounts  to
the  support  prices. Dealers  pressed  to  make  cash  payments  sold  shares  at
lower  prices,  since  the  government  did  not  purchase  all  the  available
shares. The  other  route  for  dealers  requiring  cash  was to  borrow  from
the  investment  companies  against  the  security  of shares  at government
support  prices. While  this  eased  the  dealers'  cash  flow  problems,  it
only  replaced  the  market  debt  with  commercial  debt  carrying  interest,
putting  more  strain  on the  dealers. As the  government  eased  out  of the
price  support  system  and  KSC  prices  fell,  it  became  easier  for  the  banks
to  evaluate  the  value  of the  securities  they  held.
A third  factor  in  the  decision  to  intervene  was  the  bank's
rising  awareness  that  borrowers  were  unable  to  service  their  debts  and
losses  were likely. Acting  to  protect  their  deteriorating  positions,
bank  officials  sent  warnings  and  threatening  letters,  and  finally  as the
spiral  of losses  grew,  filed  court  actions. This  sudden  shift  in
attitude  toward  banks'  best  customers,  some  of whom  were related  to
shareholders  or were  well  known,  was  a difficult  move. The rising  number
of court  cases  brought  by the  banks  prompted  the  interest  of the  National
Assembly. The  banks  had inherited  from  the  stock  markets'  crisis  dealers
and  merchants  who, in the  settlement  process,  had  been  hardened  by the  A
Panel  procedures. And in  response  the  Minister  of Finance,  in  a July
1985  economic  report,  outlined  a five-point  program  to  address  the  debt
problems  of the  financial  institutions  and  the  business  community. The
21/  See  Statistical  Appendix  7.- 22  -
report  also  proposed  new  macroeconomic  policies  to  stimulate  the  domestic
economy,  and  begin  the  process  of  structural  adjustment.
The  program  aimed  at  providing  both  moral  and  financial  support
to  allow  the  financial  institutions  to  recover.  While  losses  would  not
be  compensated,  the  government  would  lend  public  funds  at  below-market
costs.  Tne  CBK  negotiated  with  the  banks  to  begin  amicable  settlements
with  their  irregular  clients.  In  rescheduling  loans  and  provisioning,
the  banks  would  follow  CBK  guidelines.  Any  client  who  did  not  cooperate
would  be  subject  to  legal  action  by  the  banks.  Settlement  with  the
distressed  clients  would  assure  them  a  suitable  home  and  a  reasonable
income.
The  CBK would  also  determine  whether  public  funds  could  be  used
for  other  financial  institutions.  Support  would  be  based  on  the
following  criteria:
(1)  Was  the  company  performing  a  significant  activity  in  the
market?
(2)  Would  liquidation  have  harmful  effects  on  other  financial
companies  with  strong  linkages  to  foreign  financial
intermediaries?  and
(3)  Was  the  company  solvent  enough  to  continue  after  the
support  was  withdrawn?
In  November  1985  the  CBK announced  new  procedures  for  loan
classification  and  borrower  settlement  22  . In  particular,  the
settlement  procedures  emphasized  that  the  debts  of  large  debtors  and
members  of  the  boards  of  the  banks  and  investment  companies  would  be
closely  supervised  by  the  CBK.  The  loan  classification  procedures
introduced  the  concept  of  irregular  debt,  where  the  emphasis  was  on  the
cash  flow  of  the  borrower,  particularly  the  extent  and  the  period  over
which  the  loans  or  overdrafts  were  serviced.  Arrears  in  each  case  were
clearly  defined,  ranging  from  60  days  to  180  days  --  a  sharp  contrast  to
previous  method  of  increasing  the  borrowers'  credit  limit  or  loan  by  thle
accrued  interest  and  other  charges,  and  taking  such  amounts  into  the
income  statements.
The  new  provisioning  procedures  included  both  general  and
specific  provisions.  The  general  provisions  included  ..  10  percent
allocation  against  all  facilities  below  KD 20,000,  an(  a  5  percent
allocation  against  secured  irregular  facilities.  The  banks  were  also
expected  to  have  a  5  percent  allocation  against  regular  cash  facilities
and  2  1/2  percent  against  regular  noncash  facilities.  For  accrued  income
to  be  taken  into  {he  banks'  income  statements,  the  CBK required  interest
to  be  paid  in  cash,  unless  the  client  had  money  in  his  account.  In  the
~/ CBK instructions  to  the  bank  concerning  the  basis  for  loan
. classification,  provisioning,  and  accruing  income.  December  28,
1985.23
case  of  exceptions  the  accrued  income  was  to  be held in  a suspense
account  and  not  considered  in  the  banks  income  statement.
For  unsecured  irregular  facilities,  a 15  percent  allocation  was
required  after  180  days,  increasing  to  45 percent  between  180  days  and
360  days,  and  100  percent  after  360  days. While  the  financial
institutions  were  better  able  to assess  the  financial  position  of
distressed  clients,  there  was  little  progress  in  reaching  settlements.
Banks  in  particular  were reluctant  to  reach  any  agreements  that  would
include  both a larger  provision  on doubtful  debt  and  a doubtful  debt
"carryover"  without  knowing  who  was to  bear the  losses  and  in  what form.
Borrowers  were reluctant  to sign  rescheduling  agreements  and  submit
complete  financial  statements  without  knowing  just  how final  this
settlement  was,  what income  stream  they  would  be allowed  to  keep,  and
what  assets  they  would  continue  to control.
DIFFICULT  CREDIT  FACILITIES  SETTLEMENT  PROGRAM  (DCFSP)
In  August  1986  the  Difficult  Credit  Facilities  Settlement
Program  (DCFSP)  was  announced  to  formalize  and  clarify  the  relationship
between  the  government,  the  financial  institutions,  and  the  borrowers.
The  program  set  out formal  procedures  for  the  settlements  and  the  support
program. This  was the  last  of a series  of administrative  actions  that
the  government  would  take  to  resolve  a problem  that  could  have led  to a
financial  crisis.
The essential  element  of the  settlement  program  was that  one
bank,  which  had  the  largest  claim  against  the  distressed  debtor,  would
represent  all  the  other  creditors  and  had  a lien  on any  free  assets
except  for  the  debtor's  residence.  Claims  against  the  debtor  were then
classified  as follows:
(1)  Claims  backed  by assets  with  a cash  flow,  such  as real
estate,  business,  and  so  on  would  be rescheduled  for  up to
15  years  and  carry  interest  not  exceeding  7  percent,
provided  there  was  sufficient  cash  to cover  interest
payments.
(2) Claims  backed  by assets  without  any  cash  flow,  such  as
undeveloped  land. A 10-year  non-interest  bearing  loan
would  be issued  against  this  claim. Repayment  of the  loan
could  be either  from  liquidation  of the  assets  before  or on
maturity  or  by possession  of the  assets  on  maturity.
(3) Claims^not  backed  by assets. The  debtor  would  sign  a
10-year  noninterest-bearing  note that  could  be partially  or
fully  repaid  from  surplus  in  cash  flows  or in the  value  of
assets  over  other  claims. The  bank  writes  off  this
instrument  on maturity.
The  support  system  for  the  Kuwaiti  banks  consisted  of:
First,  a government  commitment  to  maintain  shareholders'  equity
at the  December  31,  1985  level  and to  guarantee  all  depositors'  funds.- 24 -
The  CBK  would  annually  issue  a net-worth  certificate  equivalent  to  the
deficit  in  provisions  needed  against  the  unsecured  notes  issued  under  the
settlement  program.
Second,  the  government  would  place  funds  with the  CBK  to
supplement  the 'deficit'  banks'  necessary  provisions  and  allow  them  to
distribute  an appropriate  level  of profits. The  CBK  could  use  these
funds  and  favorable  treatment  through  other  instruments  under  its
control,  such  as the  discount  window  and  swaps,  to support  'surplus'
banks  profitability  as  well.
While  the  CBK  has  not  disclosed  the  financial  position  of each
bank,  five  of the  six  commercial  banks  were  deficit  banks. The
specialized  banks  were  not  significantly  involved  in giving  unsecured
personal  loans  or lines  of credits. The  investment  companies'  problems
went  beyond  losses  in  loan  portfolios,  so their  activities  were  assessed
as  part  of the  restructuring  exercise. Only the  banks  were  entitled  to
financial  support; other  financial  institutions  such  as the  Kuwait
Finance  House,  were  only  entitled  to the  net  worth  certificates.
The irregular  debts  of the  banking  system  by December  1987
amounted  to  KD 2.2  billion  and involved  1,827  borrowers  (about  KD 200
million  of this  was lent  at the  request  of the  government  to  debtors  to
enable  them  to  pay  cash). Of these,  698  borrowers,  with KD 405.5  million
of debt  were found  to  be solvent,  and  the  remaining  were insolvent  or
illiquid  IQ/ . Ninety-two  percent  of the  distressed  borrowers  had
approached  the  banks  for  settlement  under  this  program. Of the  663
settlements  completed  in  1987,  the  collatoral  level  averaged  30  percent.
Assuming  that  this  ratio  will  apply  to  all  irregular  loans,  a minimum
specific  provisioning  level  of  KD 1.3  billion  will  be required;  that  is,
116  percent  of  declared  shareholders'  equity. Court  action  was taken
against  159  borrowers  constituting  6  percent  of irregular  debt. The  CBK
placed  KD 550  million  in interest-subsidized  funds  with the  banks  beside
offering  them  favorable  discount  rates  and  other  benefits  to supplement
their  provisioning  abilities.
A  March  1985  study iI/  of the  banking  systems  'own'  funds,
including  inner  reserves  and  provisions,  estimated  the  total  at KD 1.6
billion,  with  shareholders'  equity  KD 1  billion. Using  these  figures  as
a  base,  banks'  'own'  funds  reached  an estimated  KD 2.1  billion  in 1987.
The  provisions  required  against  irregular  debt  would  amount  to
approximately  KD 1.3  billion. While  this  would  exceed  the  declared
shareholders'  equity  of KD 1  billion,  inner  reserves  were  sufficient  to
provide  the  banks  an estimated  KD 783  million  in  unimpaired  equity. The
strong  reserve  position  of the  banking  system  effectively  insulated  the
system's  deposit  base.  The  existence  of  unimpaired  equity  also  explains
the  government's  willingness  to  protect  shareholders'  equity  and  assist
in  building  provisions.
Q/ Various  press  releases.
i;/ Proposal  by the  commercial  banks  to  set  up an "Asset  Management
Company"  that  would  buy  out  nonperforming  loans.- 25 
As of September  1988  irregular  debt  was  at  KD 2.8  billion
(KD  2.2  billion  in 1987)  and  was  owed  by 2,339  borrowers  (1,827  in 1987).
The  number  of the  borrowers  with  negative  net  worth  has  also increased  to
1,214  with  a debt  of KD 2  billion  I/  . While  this  will  undermine  the
position  of most  of the  banks,  it is  expected  that  rising  prices  of
shares  and  real  estate  will  have  a positive  effect.
Recently  the  CBK  changed  the  structure  of interest  rates  to
allow  Kuwait'3  rates  to  reflect  international  interest  rates. This is
expected  to  have  a sharp  effect  on Bank  profitability  by increasing  the
cost  of deposit  funds  at a time  when  a substantial  part  of their  loan
portfolios  are  nonperforming.  If the  rise  in international  interest
rates  continues,  the  CBK  may  have to increase  the  level  of support  to the
banking  system.
THE  CAUSES  OF THE  CRISIS
To understand  the  background  and  causes  of the  crisis,  it is
important  to  distinguish  between  external  shocks  to the  economy  and
internal  fiscal,  monetary,  and  institutional  causes. Two shocks  affected
the-economy  from  1979  to  1981  I/  . First,  a sharp  decline  in  oil  prices
and  crude  oil  production  cut  public  revenues  from  KD 6  billion  in 1980  to
KD 3  billion  in 1982,  a 50  percent  drop. While  this  did  not  affect  total
government  expenditures,  as a result  of  withdrawals  from  investment
reserves  3A/  ,  shifts  within  expenditure  items  could  have contributed  to
precipitating  the  crisis. The  effect  of oil  accounted  for  33  percent  of
average  GDP from  1980  to 1982,  compared  to 30  percent  from  1980  to 1985
(though  there  was  some  improvement  from  1983  to  1984).
Second,  the  Iraq-Iran  war slowed  trade  with  neighboring
countries  and  contributed  to  dampening  confidence  in the  domestic
economy. Nonoil  exports  to the  Middle  East,  which  had  peaked  in  1981  at
$2.2  billion,  declined  by 1986  to $1.1  billion  jU/ ,  a 49 percent  drop.
Of this,  the  war  contributed  a decline  in  exports  from  $1.1  billion  in
1981  to  $370  million  in 1984,  a  drop  of 68  percent. the  share  of  Middle
East  exports  in  GDP  was  about  4.9  percent,  with  the  Iraq-Iran  war
contributing  3.4  percent  i/
I2/  Figures  from  CBK.
I2/  P.G.  Sadler.  op.cit.  P. 8.
i§/ Government's  6udget  revenues  do  not include  income  from  investment  of
government  reserves.
i2/ International  Monetary  Fund.  Direction  of  Trade  Statistics.
Washington,  D.C.  1986,  1987.
i2J  Wholesale  and  retail  trade  as a share  of  GDP  declined  32  percent
(1984  prices)  from  1982  to  1983.- 26
Structural  Factors.  Four  internal  factors  related  to fiscal  and
monetary  policy. The  role  of  government  fiscal  policies;  the  role  of
monetary  expansion,;  whether  institutional  or stock  market-related;  the
role  of regulatory  authorities;  and  the  behavior  of the  dealers,  banks,
investment  companies,  and  Gulf  and  Kuwaiti  shareholding  companies.
To understand  the  role  of the  government,  it is important  to
look  at the  structure  of the  Kuwaiti  economy  in the  period  preceding  the
crisis. Kuwait  is essentially  an oil-based  economy,  but the  oil  sector
provides  relatively  little  direct  benefit  to  the  population. In 1985
while  this  sector  produced  52  percent  of  GDP it  employed  only  about  1
percent  of the  total  labor  force .1/  . Since  oil  is  a government
monopoly,  the  real  benefits  to the  economy  come  from  government
expenditures  in  other  sectors.
Two  patterns  in  GDP  are  worth  noting  from  1974  to 1987  (see
figure  5).  First,  nonoil  GDP  increased  from  20  percent  to 55  percent  of
GDP; and  second,  while  the  oil  sector  and  total  GDP  began  declining  in
198O,  nonoil  GDP  started  to  decline  in  1982,  but  not  by the  same  extent,
primarily  as a result  of  government  expenditures.  Real  GDP  also  declined
from  1979  to  1982,  falling  43 percent. It is  not  surprising  that  there
was a shift  from  real  to financial  assets  and  speculation  in real  estate
and  stocks  by investors  searching  for  substitute  income  sources.
r/  Kuwait  Ministry  of Planning,  Annual  Statistical  Abstract.  1987.*  27 -
FIGURE  5:  GROSS  DOMESTIC  PRODUCT
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The relative  importance  of the  major  components  of GDP  shifted
from  1974  to 1982,  with  declines  in  manufacturing  and  increases  in trade,
financial  services,  and  government  spending. Government  expenditures  are
significant  not  only  because  of the  large  role  of the  government  sector
but  also  because  of the  effect  of government  spending  on other  sectors,
such  as trade  and  construction  - directly  through  procurement  or
indirectly  through  civil  service  salaries  /  .
There  were three  significant  changes  in this  respect  (see  figure
6):
o  Government  spending  dropped  from  1982  to 1986,  after  rising
27 percent  during  the  preceding  three  years.
o  The  government  budget  was  in  deficit  for  four  of the  five
fiscal  years  after  the  stock  market  crisis,  and  the  deficit
was  financed  by government  reserves.
O  Land  purchase,  a form  of direct  transfer  payment,  increased
68 percent  from  1979  to 1982  and  decreased  by 69 percent
from  1982  to  1985. The  increase  in 1982  was  part  of the
government  policy  to inject  funds  into  the  economy  to
support  asset  prices,  particularly  since  most  receivers  of
funds  would  normally  have  bought  land  or shares  with the
money. However,  with  decreases  in  asset  prices,  this  was
not  the  case.
28/  The  World  Bank.  Kuwait.  Recent  Economic  DeveloDment  and  ProsRects.  P.
19 (unpublished).- 29  ,
FIGURE 6:.  GOVERNMENT  REVENUES  AND  EXPENDITURES
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The government's  role  was  also  significant  at the  micro  level.
To encourage  diversification  and investment  the  government  often
established  companies  and  sold  shares  to the  private  sector. In  some
cases  unsuccessful  companies  were  subsidized,  and  in  others  the
government  effectively  bought  all  the  shares. By 1974  the  government
owned  41  percent  of all  KSCs,  and  during  the  1976/77  stock  market  break,
supported  stock  prices  by purchasing  shares. During  the  same  period  the
government  bought  out two  KSCs  - an oil  refinery  and  a fertilizer  plant.
As a result,  by December  31,  1979,  the  government  owned  35  percent  of all
outstanding  shares  in  the  listed  KSCs. The  strong  government  presence
inhibited  private  sector  enterprises  that  found  it  difficult  to compete
with  subsidized  and  protected  shareholding  companies. By 1983  the
government  owned  48 percent  of  all  KSCs,  as a result  of the  share  support
program.
While  the  real  economy  was in  a recession  as government
expenditures  fell,  there  was  an  exceptional  expansion  of liquidity  during
1980  and  1981  contributing  to an inflation  in  real  estate  and stock
values  (see  figure  7).  Several  factors  contributed  to the  increase  in
liquidity:
o  Toward  the  third  quarter  of 1981,  as interest  rates  in the
Eurodollar  market  fell  from  18  percent  to 9  percent,
depositors  moved  funds  from  foreign  currencies  to  KDs.
Foreign  deposits,  which  constituted  20  percent  of total
deposits  in  June  1981,  fell  almoL:  50  percent  by a  year
later. At the  same  time  demand  deposits  rose  122.3  percent
as depositors  chose  to  stay  liquid. Total  deposits  rose  85
percent,  from  KD 2.1  billion  to  KD 3.8  billion,  from  1979
to 1982.
o  Commercial  bank  lending  grew  103.4  percent,  while  personal
loans  and  loans  to financial  institutions  grew  92.4  percent
and 123  percent,  respectively,  during  the  same  period.
Domestic  lending  by investment  companies  increased  from
KD 80.1  in 1979  to  KD 461.6  million  in  1982,  or 576
percent. Domestic  loans  by the  specialized  banks  doubled
from  KD  493  million  in 1979  to  KD 994  million  in  1982.
After  1982,  while  total  commercial  bank  lending  continued
to increase  slowly,  the  increases  consisted  of accrued
interest  and  the  discounting  of the  creditor  guarantee
funds'  bonds,  which  reached  almost  10  percent  of total
claims  against  the  private  sector  in  1983. By 1986  the
bonds  discounted  had reached  KD 602  million  2J .
O  The  creation  of debt  instruments  outside  the  scope  of the
financi4l  system  and  the  regulatory  authorities  in the  form
of postdated  cheques  was  perhaps  the  most  important
liquidity  creating  instrument.  While  the  gross  claims  of
the  market  were  KD 26.7  billion,  the  net  claims  were  KD 7.5
2_/  Central  Bank  of  Kuwait. The  Economic  Re2ort. 1986.  PP.  25-26  and
the  World  Bank. op.cit.  P. 41.- 31  -
billion,  192  percent  of total  bank lending  to residents  in
1982  and  slightly  above  total  commercial  bank assets.
FIGURE  7:  DOMESTIC  LIQUIDITY
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While  the  increase  in  domestic  liquidity  was the  main impetus
behind  the  initial  increases  in  asset  prices,  postdated  cheques  took  over
as the  driving  force  as  higher  and  higher  premiums  were  offered. The external  shocks,  the  termination  of future  trading,  and the  subsequent
restrictions  in  bank lending  all  contributed  to the  rapid  decline  in
asset  prices.
The  Role  of  Regulatory  Instltutlons.  From  1979  to 1982  the  CBK
took  a number  of measures  that  ultimately  had  little  effect  on bank
lending  AQ/  and  may  have contributed  to increasing  domestic  liquidity,
including  the  following:
jQ/ Central  Bank  of Kuwait.  op.cit.  p. 41.- 32 -
(1) KD deposits  in foreign  banks  were  no longer  considered
liquid  assets  from  April  1979. This  led  to an active
Kuwaiti  interbank  market  and  reduced  the  proportion  of
foreign  assets  to total  assets  from  33  percent  in  1979  to
24.6  percent  in 1982.
(2)  To reduce  the  banklng  system's  exposure  to  overdrafts,  the
ratio  of  overdrafts  to  total  credit  facilities  was reduced
from  55  percent  to  40 percent  between  1980  and  1982. As
banks  changed  their  lending  structure  to  a larger
proportion  of loans,  clients  drew  their  money  immediately
since  they  were  being  charged  interest,  and invested  in the
stock  market. Under  the  overdraft  system  clients  were  only
charged  interest  when they  withdrew  funds.
(3)  Instead  of lending  at low  interest  rates  to  productive
sectors,  the  banks  found  it  more  profitable  to  make  term
loans  to individuals  and  financial  institutlons.  These
loans  returned  higher  rates  and  yielded  more income  through
compensatory  financing,  commissions,  and fees.
It seems  clear  that  the  CBK's  policies  were too  weak,  and in
fact  a  number  of indicators  should  have  served  as warning  signals,
includlng:  the  rapid  increase  in  lending  to  nonproductive  sectors;  the
high concentration  of loans  to  large  borrowers  in  the  portfolios  of
commereial  banks  41/  ;  and  the  inflation  in  stock  and  real  estate  prices
whieh  the  commercial  banks  accepted  as security.  (see  figure  8).
41/  See  Statistical  Appendix  7.- 33  -
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A further  cause  of concern  should  have  been the  increase  in
cheque  clearing. From  a  monthly  average  of KD 1.2  billion  in  1981,  the
total  peaked  in  July 1982  at  KD 3.9  billion. This  was  a clear  indication
that  future  cheques  were  being  cashed  and  should  have  warned  authorities
of the  need  for  restrictions.  Moreover,  the  development  of  debt
instruments  outside  the  CBK  control  should  have  been  stopped. First  to
impose  credit  controls,  and  also  because  the  credit  risk  information  that
the  CBK  shared  with the  banks  as a  basis  for  bank  lending  was  no longer
adequate.
Apparently  the  CBK  saw  its  role  as essentially  one  of servicing
the  banks'  needs  for  foreign  exchange,  swaps,  clearing,  and  credit  risk
information.  Thus  officials  did  not  use  monetary  policy  to control
liquidity,  though  they  did  have  open-market  instruments  available,
including  treasury  bills  and  the  discount  rate.
For  example,  the  CBK  cut  its  discount  and  rediscount  facilities
from  KD 600  million  to  KD 320  million  at the  end  of 1981  and  1982  42/ .
While  this  was  designed  to  reduce  liquidity,  the  banks  had increased
their  deposits  with the  CBK  from  KD 238  million  in 1980  to  KD 732  million
in  1982. The  CBK  actions  were  not  significant  relative  to the  size  of
the  banks'  liquid  assets  when  the  banks  were  net  depositors.  While  the
CBK  also  moved  to issuing  shorter  term  treasury  bills  in  early  1982,  and
in  May  prohibited  the  banks  from  giving  credit  against  future  cheques  and
Gulf  company  shares,  it  was  too  late  to  control  domestic  liquidity.  The
stock  market  had  already  peaked  and  was  declining  and, in fact,  these
actions  may  have  accelerated  the  decline.
While  the  stock  market  authorities  were excluded  from  any
supervision  of the  parallel  market,  the  market  developed  very rapidly
without  government  interference  for  so long  that  traders  assumed  the
market  was legal. In fact,  prices  were  continuously  quoted  for  the
KSCCs,  even  though  share  sales  were  illegal  before  the  three-year  period.
The  stock  market  committee  could  have  intervened  at that  time  to  halt the
formation  of KSCCs.
Although  the  stock  market  committee  had  wide  powers  under  the
law,  officials  did  not  set  up procedures  or  mechanisms  for  effective
regulation.  Moreover,  authorities  should  have  controlled  trading  in the
Kuwaiti  shareholding  companies  on the  grounds  that  KSCs  are  restricted  to
investing  in  the  specific  area  proscribed  in  the  by-laws,  and  cannot
invest  at random  in  other  sectors. The  Ministry  annually  sends  a
representative  to the  company's  shareholders  meeting  to ascertain  that
the  company's  by-laws  have  not  been  violated. At that  time  officials
could  have  curtailed  the  wide-ranging  investments  in  the  stock  market.
In  fact,  many  companies  paid  dividends  in 1984  and  1985,  even  though  they
showed  large  losses  and their  investments  were  valued  at above-market
prices,  artificially  improving  their  overall  financial  position. Even
more  surprising  the  external  auditors  did  not  note  on their  statements
that  there  were  violations  or that  the  assets  of the  company  were
overvalued.
A2/  Central  Bank  of  Kuwait.  The  Kuwaiti  Economy  1980-1984.  P. 72.- 35
The  behavior  of the  dealers,  merchants,  banks,  investment
companies,  and  the  Kuwaiti  and  Gulf  shareholding  companies  was  also
influential.  While  the  recession  may  explain  a shift  in preference  from
real  to financial  assets,  the  degree  of speculation  and  disregard  for  the
law  reflects  badly  on the  long-established  dealers  and  merchants  who
formed  the  new  companies  and  traded  in them,  setting  the  pattern  for
other  participants.  This  same  group  looked  to the  government  to take  the
downside  risk  of its  investment  strategy.
The  banks  and investment  companies  not  only  lent  heavily  into  an
inflated  market,  but  shifted  the  structure  of their  assets  toward  both
larger  and  more  speculative  borrowers  4.V . This  was  primarily  the
responsibility  of the  Boards  of Directors,  particularly  their  lending
committees.  Management  did  not  develop  lending  opportunities  in  the
international  market,  nor  did it  examine  the  risks  of domestic  lending.
Management  accounting  systems  for  accruing  income  on loans  and  overdrafts
by increasing  the  credit  facilities  even  when  no payments  were  received
by the  borrowers  artificially  boosted  the  profits  of the  banks  and
reinforced  their  behavior.
During  the  stock  market  crisis  the  financial  institutions  that
owned  the  clearing  company  had  detailed  positions  of all  the
participants.  These  institutions  unfortunately  made  no effort  to analyze
the  information.  Nor  did  they  protect  their  creditor  status  in the  laws
that  were  passed. For  example,  the  clearing  company  made payments  on
behalf  of the  Guarantee  Fund  to dealers  even  though  the  dealers  owed
money  to the  banks. The  banks  also  discounted  the  bonds  for  clients,
many  of whom  withdrew  the  cash  and  later  applied  for  the  DCSFP.  (The
procedure  was later  changed  at the  prompting  of the  Settlement
Organization  so that  the  dealers  had  to clear  all  commitments  in  the
clearing  system  and  the  banks  before  receiving  any  cash.)
Although  some  Kuwaiti  and  Gulf  shareholding  companies  had
inexperienced  management.  their  boards  of directors  had the  fiduciary
responsibility,  and  most  of them  either  lent  or traded  company  funds  on
the  market  and  exposed  their  shareholders  to  great  risk. Even
established  Kuwaiti  companies  suffered  from  weak  management  and
interference  from  board  members. Companies  that  could  have  remained
profitable  and  strong  were  weakened  by high  leverage,  technical
mismanagement,  a recessionary  environment,  and  speculative  assets  that
had  little  to  do  with the  company's  business.
RESTRUCTURING.
A government  study  of 37  Kuwaiti  shareholding  companies  (nine  of
which  were  listed:KSCCs  formed  before  1981)  identified  a  number  of short-
and  long-run  problems. The  Kuwait  Investment  Authority  (responsible  for
the  government's  investment  portfolio)  was  asked  to  set  up a supervision
system  to  address  the  long-term  problems. The  availability  of qualified
i2J  Figures  available  for  commercial  banks  loans  in  March  1985  show that
0.4  percent  of  borrowers  accounted  for  60  percent  of the  loans.- 36-
Kuwaiti  management  was  identified  as  a fundamental  problem,  and  a  human
resource  information  base  was  set  up to identify  now  managers  and  board
members. The  short-run  problems  were identified  as:
(1)  Incompetence  by the  Board  of Directors  and  management;
(2) Weak financial  structure;
(3) Technical  problems  or changes  in  economic  conditions;
(4)  Marketing  problems;
(5) Falling  asset  prices.
Of the  37  companies,  one  real  estate  and  four  industrial
companies  were  liquidated.  Two  manufacturing  companies  were integrated,
three  transport  companies  were  restructured,  and  the  remaining  17  were
reorganized.
The  study  found  the  situation  of the  37  KSCCs  formed  after  1981
was  much  worse. Only  four  companies  were  profitable,  24  had lost  50 to
100  percent  of their  equity,  and  three  had  negative  net  worth. Out  of a
total  equity  of KD 378  million,  these  companies  had lost  about  40 percent
of their  capital;  of the  remaining  capital  only  KD 68  million  was in
liquid  assets;  the  rest  was in  shares  and  property.
Twenty-four  firms  were liquidated,  five  real  estate  companies
were  merged  and 10  companies  remained  in  business,  under  the  supervision
of the  investment  authority. Of the  33  Gulf  companies  included  in the
report,  26  were investigated;  seven  refused  to  cooperate. Only two  were
profitable,  the  rest  had  lost  substantial  portions  of their  capital.
Since  direct  action  was  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of the  government,  the
shareholders  were  asked  to initiate  actions. Only  those  cooperating  with
the  Ministry  were  given  the  benefits  of  the  share  purchase  program  and
were  allowed  to  operate  in  Kuwait.
,.  4
The  CBK  found  that  a  number  of  exchange  companies  had  violated
their  articles  of association  by practicing  banking  or investment
activities.  Depending  on the  extent  of the  violations,  the  companies
were  either  registered  with  the  CBK  or their  licenses  were  withdrawn. By
September  1988,  48 companies  were  registered  and 13  withdrawn  /  .
In the  face  of liquidation  and  restructuring,  the  problem  was
how to  handle  the  resulting  assets  and  how to  compensate  the
shareholders.  The  government  plan  called  for  buying  the  assets  of the
problem  companies  at their  economic  values  and  compensating  shareholders
with  cash,  three-gear  bonds,  or shares  in  successful  companies.
As for  the  banks,  the  CBK  required  all  board  members  who asked
for  relief  under  the  DCFSP  to resign  their  positions. The investment
authority  also  appointed  new  members  in  banks  with government
A4/  Al-Watan  Newspaper. September  21,  1988. Kuwait.- 37 -
shareholding.  The  CBK  now  approves  the  appointment  of all  board  members
prior  to their  election  and  regulates  lending,  liquidity  and internal
investment  and  control. All  banks  must  present  an annual  plan  to  support
their  capital  base, including  information  on the  bank's  performance  and
its  ability  to  provision  and  improve  the  quality  of its  assets. The
central  bank  has  also  increased  its  inspection  staff  4j  .
In addition  the  CBK  has  been  given  a  number  of effective
monetary  policy  management  tools,  including  the  authority  to issue  up to
KD 1.4  billion  in  government  bonds. This  effectively  gives  the  CBK  an
open-market  operation  instrument.  As of  July  1988,  KD 1.4  billion  in
public  debt  had  been issued.
Stock  Markee  Reform.  In  August  1984  the  Kuwait  Stock  Exchange
was  set  "p as an independent  authority  chaired  by the  Minister  of
Commerce. The  exchange  is  responsible  for  setting  up and supervising
trading  procedures,  registering  brokers,  and  developing  the  market. Two
legal  committees  were  established  with full  authority  to rule  on  disputes
and  take  disciplinary  actions,  such  as warnings,  calling  in guarantees,
terminating  trading  in  a stock,  and  withdrawing  membership. Both  Kuwaiti
and  foreign  shares  and  bonds  and  other  financial  instruments  licensed  by
the  exchange  committee  can  be traded. All  companies  are  required  to
provide  regular  financial  data  to the  exchange.
The  exchange  has  been  operating  for  four  years  with  active
supervision  of registration=and  trading. Clearing  procedures  have  been
simplified  and  the  exchange  regularly  publishes  information  on listed
shares. The  exchange  has  adopted  procedures  to:  limit  daily  price
movements;  regulate  brokers;  regulate  forward  trading  (not  yet
implemented);  and  appoint  and  regulate  market  makers  for  specific  shares.
Costs  of  the  Solution.  It is important  to distinguish  between
what  was  spent  by the  government  and  what the  actual  cost  was.  The  cost
of the  share  purchase  schemes,  for  example,  depends  on the  prices  of
these  shares  when  they  are  offered  in the  privatization  effort. The  best
estimate  is  based  on the  differences  in  the  stock  index  between  the
acquisition  period  and  1987 §J . Each  scheme  is  estimated  separately
below:
o  Creditor  Guarantee  Fund: An audit  showed  that  KD 1  billion
was  paid  out  either  in  cash  or  bonds. Against  this,
KD 101.4  million  was  collected  by the  clearing  company  from
the  1  percent  fee,  and  KD 212  million  in  bonds  was issued
to the  Ministry  by the  settlement  organization  for  debtors
whose  cheques  were guaranteed.  The  Fund's  capital  was
i2J Central  Bank  of Kuwait. Notes  to guidelines.  September  20,  1988.
i2/ This  is expected  to  underestimate  the  real  cost  to the  extent  that
inferior  company  shares  were  used  by dealers  either  in  the  sales  to
the  government  or the  placement  of security  against  loans.- 38
recently  increased  by  KD 670  million  to  KD 1.2  billion,  AZ/
presumably  to cover  the  rnet  deficit  in the  Fu-nd's  capital
position.
0  Loans  against  shares: The two  investment  companies  in
which  the  government  has  a controlling  interest  lent  KD 897
million  against  KSC  shares  and  real  estate. The  banks  were
also  asked  to lend  to  debtors  of the  settlement
organization  against  both  KSC  and  KSCC  shares  so that
dealers  owing  funds  to  distressed  dealers  transferred  to
the  settlements  organization  could  pay  cash. The  KD 200
million  lent  was  part  of the  settlement  program,  so that
the  provisioning  costs  were  shared  by the  banks  and  the
government.  The  KSC share  index  moved  down from  the
support  level  of  about  460 to  232  in 1987,  or 50.6  percent.
The real  estate  index  also  moved  from  206  in 1982  to  94.9
in 1985. Since  most  of the  dealers  joined  the  DCFSP,  the
cost  to the  government  would  be similar  to that  of  having
purchased  the  shares  and  real  estate. Assuming  a 25
percent  real  estate  anl  75  percent  share  portfolio,  the
approximate  cost  would  be KD 435  million  4.V  .
0  KSC  share  suDDort  Rr2gram:  The  government  purchased  shares-
worth  KD 1.1  billion  in  1983  (at  support  prices)  directly
from  the  market  and  another  KD 144  million  from  the
Settlement  Organization.  At 1987  prices  the  value  was
KD 634  million,  with  net  costs  of  KD 624  million.
o  Restructuring:  To enable  it  to liquidate,  restructure  or
merge  firms,  the  government  bought  KD 243  million  in  KSCC
shares  and  KD 34.7  million  in  Gulf shares. It is  quite
possible  that  the  government  will  make  a profit  on the  sale
of these  assets  after  the  restructuring.
o  SuRRort  of bAnkini  system: A total  of KD 500  million  was
placed  with  the  banks;  the  average  5  percent  interest  loss
amounts  to  about  KD 27.5  million  annually.
ISSUES  FOR  EVALUATION
Two  fundamental  issues  are  under  government  review:  the
government's  future  role  in the  economy,  and  the  structure  of the  nonoil
sector. Fiscal  policy  management  and  extensive  ownership  of domestic
institutions  and  services  is  at the  heart  of the  first  issue. Assuming
crude  oil  prices  of $25  to $27  a  barrel,  economists  from  the  World  Bank
and  other  sources.^have  forecast  that  the  present  expenditure  structure
41/  Kuwait  Ministry  of Commerce. Law  number  42.  1988.
4&/  Real  estate  index  available  only  up to  1985. An index  developed  by a
private  consulting  firm (Al-Shall)  shows  further  deterioration  in
real  estate  prices  during  1986  with some  improvements  in  1987.39 -
will  be unsustainable  in  the  next  decade. With  the  increasing
uncertainty  of oil  prices  and  current  indications  that  the  level  is
expected  to  remain  at $14  to $18  a  barrel,  expenditure  rationalization  is
necessary.
The  present  expenditure  pattern  developed  as  a result  of the  oil
wealth,  which  enabled  the  government  to  provide  all  basic  services  to the
population.  This  has  resulted  in  free  health  and  education;  subsidized
electricity,  water,  housing,  gasoline,  and  some  food  items. These
combined  subsidies  are  expected  to amount  to  KD 1.5  billion  by the  year
2000  4j/ ,  about  63  percent  of 1986  budget  revenues,  and  about  31  percent
of total  revenues  (including  investment  income)  in the  same  year.
While some  subsidies  will be retained, particularly for lower
income  groups,  a restructuring  would  serve  the  dual  purposes  of
rationalizing  expenditures  and  attaining  a  better  allocation  of
resources. For  housing  and  food  items,  this  would  mean targeting
subsidies  toward  the  lower  income  groups. Utilities  could  change  their
pricing  structure  to  achieve  full  cost  recovery  and  eventually  aim  for
privatization.  While  the  Ministry  of Health  is  currently  studying  the
charges  for  services  and  drugs,  it  would  be preferable  to  avoid  a larger
bureaucracy  for  collecting  fees  and  move  directly  to  a medical  insurance
system. This  would  also  help in  restructuring  the  health  system  as an
independent  authority  or privatizing  parts  of it  so that  private-sector
employers  can  directly  contribute  toward  the  cost  of the  health  service.
Such a restructuring also  increasr  the government's
effectiveness  in  managing  a  pricing  and  subsidy  policy  within  the
framework  of burdensharing  with the  private  sector. A more  realistic
pricing  of services  is  also  a  necessary  element  in  achieving  the
allocative  effects  of the  restructuring  actions  in the  private  sector.
This  essential  change  in  the  government's  role  is  crucial  for  the  future
development  of the  nonoil  sector.
A reduction  of the  government's  ownership  in the  equity  base of
the  shareholding  companies  is  another  essential  ingredient.  'hile the
government's  role  in the  restructuring  exercises  is  commendable,  the
Kuwait  Investment  Authority  cannot  be expected  to  manage  all  the
restructured  companies,  particularly  with  managers  and  board  members  that
have  no  ownership  in the  institutions.  The  privatization  effort  should
include  criterion  for  the  sale  of blocks  of shares  to  private  sector
groups  that  have  viable  management  talent  with  relevant  experience. In
this  way the  government's  involvement  in  both  the  equity  base  and  the
direct  management  of companies  would  be reduced.
The  second  issue  concerns  the  structure  of the  nonoil  economy.
In the  medium  term  the  rationalization  of  government  expenditures,  the
restructuring  of services,  and  the  privatization  efforts  will decrease
the  government's  role. The  essential  question  is  how  to develop  the
sector  so that  it  can  be an alternative  to the  oil  sector  in terms  of
A2/  The  World  Bank. Kuwait.  Recent  Economic  Development  and  Prospects.
November  1984. p. 81.* 40 -
diversification  of income  and  employment.  A series  of long-term  strategy
papers  have  recently  been  completed  by a  MIT-Harvard  Team  and  are
currently  being  reviewed  by the  Higher  Planning  Council.
While  a specific  plan  of  action  remains  to  be worked  out,  the
development  of Kuwait's  financial  institutions  will  remain  crucial  to the
development  of other  sectors  of the  economy. The  financial  institutions'
exposure  to external  markets  should  enable  them  to  develop  Kuwait's
financial  services  and  capital  markets  so as to  increase  the  number  of
investment  opportunities  available. This  would  also  contribute  towards
greater  financial  stability  in  the  domestic  financial  markets,
particularly  by allowing  investors  to  diversify  out  of  Kuwaiti  stocks  and
avoid  the  speculation  that  led  to the  stock  market  crisis.
The  short-term  expansion  of the  private  sector,  particularly
through  privatization,  is  also  going  to  require  imaginative  financing
arrangements  by the  banks  and  investment  companies.  However,  since  a
large  number  of the  active  merchants  are  part  of the  DCFSP,  it  may  be
difficult  to  formulate  investment  syndicates  to  buy  out  and  manage
particular  companies. In this  respect,  the  CBK  may  need  to examine
alternatives  for  accelerating  the  writeoff  of the  unsecured  portions  of
nonperforming  debt  to  give  both the  banks  and  the  DCFSP  clients  more
flexibility  in  seeking  new  business. One  alter'iative  would  be to form  an
entity  to take  over  the  assets  of companies  or individuals  with
nonperforming  loans. This  would  be  particularly  useful  for  those  assets
in  which  the  clients  have  an insignificant  managemont  role  in increasing
the  assets'  value  or  cash  flows.
The  Kuwaiti  banks  had  proposed  a similar  solution,  recommending
the  establishment  of a  company  jointly  owned  by the  banks  and  the
government  to  purchase  the  assets  of distressed  clients  with
nonperforming  loans  52/  . The  banks  felt  this  would  substantially
improve  their  loan  portfolio,  relieve  management  of the  burden  of
supervision,  and  provide  liquidity.  The  new  institution  would  also
provide  the  long-term  funding  needed  by distressed  clients  who  were
potentially  solvent.
This  alternative  has  merits  in  a small  young  country  like  Kuwait
where  management  talent  and  experience  are  scarce  and  need  to  be
optimally  utilized. The  sooner  the  distressed  businesses  emerge  from  the
settlement  programs,  the  sooner  they  will  be able  to  pursue  new  business
opportunities.  The  banks  would  also  find  it  easier  to  lend  to entities
that  are  not  related  to  nonperforming  loans  on their  books.
While  it is too  early  to  judge  how  the  banks  would  react  to loan
applications  from  clients  who  are  part  of the  DCFSP,  it is  evident  that
there  remain  serious  problems  with  large  borrowers  who  consider  the
program  a constraint  on expansion  and  naw  activities.  The issue  is that
bank  management  is involved  in lengthy  legal  procedures  and  committee
meetings  with the  Central  Bank  over  changes  in the  asset  mix  of a client
EQ/  Proposal  for  Asset  Management  Company. National  Bank  of  Kuwait.
1985.- 41 -
or the  amount  of funds  that  the  client  can  retain. The  supervision  and
monitoring  process  needs  to  be simplified  so that  decisions  can  proceed.
One  way  of combining  the  shortcomings  of the  DCFSP  with the
restructuring  exercises  and  the  private  sector  role  would  be to  expand
the  equity  base  of the  restructured  companies  so that  they  can  buy  the
assets  held against  the  nonperforming  loans  of che  banks. The  companies
could  purchase  the  assets  that  conform  to their  expertise  at  market
prices  or at a  discount. This  would  effectively  substitute  the  loan
financing  of the  assets  for  equity,  which  is  a far  more  suitable
financial  structure  for  such  assets. This  could  substantially  expand  the
equity  base  of the  economy. The investment  companies  would  have to
intermediate  savings  directly  into  equity  and  effectively  terminate  the
past  practice  of borrowing  to  purchase  equity. It  is also  this  essential
change  in  the  financial  structure  that  will  shift  the  disproportionate
risk  assumed  by the  financial  institutions  to the  investors. Such  a
shift  of risk  would  also  reduce  the  vibrations  to the  financial
institutions  as a result  of shocks  to the  equity  base and  contribute  to
financial  stability.- 42 -
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STATISTICAL  AFPPENDIX  1
0Uuwait Money
(In millirt!s  of  l:uwaiti  Dinars)
:  :BNKING SYSTEM'S  5
I  :  *  DOMESTIC  5  CLAIS1  O(N
DATE  2  MONEY  :QUASI-  MONEY:  LIQUIDIrY  :FRIVATE  SECTOR
====sx  s=aw==..:  I , w=a==  -:  =====_=====-  -:=  2=-=--
19753  290.3d  2  600.80  891.10  506.70
3/76  :  Z48.60  :  615.60  :  964.20  59'.'0
6/76  :  402.00  :  699.30  :  1,101.30  :  703.40  2
9/76  :  387.60  :  757.50  :  1,145.10  :  809.00
12/76  :  393.70  :  826.40  :  1,220.10  1  934-3.0
3/77  :  424.10  :  688.Z0  :  1,312.40  :  947.10
6/77  :  449.00  :  956.80  :  1,405.80  2  1.082.90  :
9/77  1  447.80  995.20  1  1,443.00  1  1,177.60  1
12/77  490.70  2  1,078.00  1  1,568.70  :  1,236.70
3/78  2  550.40  :  1,061.30  2  1,611.70  2  1,192.50  :
6/78  :  596.00  '  1,128.00  :  1,724.00  2  1,282.00
9/78  2  630.60  2  1,215.00  2  1,845.60  2  1,355.10  2
12/78  2  656.40  2  1,314.00  :  1,950.40  2  1,564.10  2
3/79  6h6.90  1,319.30  1,986.20  :  1,670.20  2
6/79  :  615.30  2  1,363.10  2  2,038.40  2  1,818.10  1
9/79  2  725.80  2  1,521.80  2  2,247.60  :  2,088.90  I
12/79  2  669.40  2  1,593.30  2  2,262.70  1  2,123.60  .
3/80  :  699.60  :  1,782.60  :  2,482.20  2  2,244.70  :
6/80  792.70  :  1,839.70  2  2,632.40  2  2,306.10  1
9/80  2  795.50  :  1,963.20  2  2,75B.70  2  2,566.80  2
12/80  2  720.80  :  2,136.80  2  2,857.60  1  2,676.50  :
3/81  2  82.3.70  2  2,151.00  2  2,974.70  :  2,802.50  :
6/81  2  1,041.90  :  2,343.70  2  3,385.60  2  2,991.70  :
9/81  1,019.90  2  2,505.50  2  3,525.40  2  5,170.70  2
12/81  2  1,290.20  1  2,575.80  2  3,866.00  1  3,459.00  1
3/82  2  1,629.90  1  2,575.10  2  4,205.00  2  3,975.00  2
6/82  2  1,695.70  :  2,566.70  2  4,262.40  1  4,150.20  :
9/82  1,263.70  2  2,849.50  2  4,113.20  2  4,341.00  :
12/82  2  1,247.60  1  2,935.10  2  4,182.70  2  4,277.70  1
3/83  I  1,  331.0  2,e  866.60  2  4,217.80  1  ; *4,429.00  2
6/83  :  1,348.302  2,920.002  4,268.30  :  4.530.502
9/83  :  1,223.70  2  2,996.60  2  4,220.50  2  4,515.00  2
12/83  2  1,179.60  2  3,188.20  2  4,-367.80  2  4.743.10  2
3/84  2  1,135.80  2  3,208.20  2  4,344.00  2  4,811.90
6/84  2  1,097.80  2  3,166.10  2  4.263.90  2  4,887.40  2
9/84  2  1,024.50  :  3,297.40  2  4,321.90  :  4,954.08  2
12/84  2  968.10  2  3,507.70  2  4,475.80  2  5,035.80  2
3/85  2  954.30  2  3,550.50  2  4,504.80  2  4,972.80  2
6/85  2  985.30  2  3,397.30  2  4,582.60  2  4,999.40  2
9/85  2  956.40  :  3,615.10  2  4,'71.50  2  5,097.20  2
12/85  :  943.90  :  3,491.40  2  4,455.  30  :  5.052.50  2
3/86  82.10  2  3,434.20  2  4,432.40  2  5,065.40  2
6/86  2  994.70  2  3,435.00  2  4,448.00  2  5,127.20  2
9/86  2  990.10  2  3,583.90  :  4,591.10  :  5,157.10  2
12/86  2  979.30  2  .,567.60  2  4,546.90  :  .5,154.0:
3/87  2  1,028.10  2  3,437.60  :  4,465.70  2  5,171.70  2
6/87  :  1,g23.20  3,617.20  2  4,640.40  :  5,476.10  2
9/87  2  976.60  2  3,716.50  2  4,693.10  2  5,531.80  2
12/87  2  1,0-5.60  2  3,726.40  2  4,762.00  2  5,596.90  2
3/88  2  999.20  2  3,888.10  2  4,886.30  :  5.846.40  2
6/88  e
Sources  International  Financial  Statistics,  various  editions.STATISTICAL  APPENDIX  2
KLWAITI  COMMERCIAL  BAWKS  - Clais  Against  the  Private  Sector
(In  millions  of  Ktwaiti  Diners)
End of  Period  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
Trade  81.00  11.90  164.30  292.40  375.60  400.20  523.50  §71.80  843.20  955.30  948.80  987.70  932.80  920.20  962.10
Industry  110S3  15.60  24.80  37.20  49.20  65.70  91.30  159.20  174.30  193.60  148.20  144.90  122.20  106.40  140.30
Construction  53.40  80.50  97.00  166.70  199.40  254.40  332.20  408.00  523.20  673.40  664.20  683.20  680.00  701.10  784.70
Agriculture
and  Fisheries  12.80  9.10  9.90  14.30  20.00  25.10  30.60  39.90  40.20  43.00  25.70  23.80  21.80  15.40  11.80
FinanciaL  I  Other
Services  38.60  47.40  93.80  167.60  215.80  319.70  120.90  142.80  236.00  269.90  314.10  360.60  360.90  371.40  465.50
*Personal  Loans  48.90  77.80  72.70  171.10  212.60  319.70  520.10  620.70  890.30  1000.50  934.50  1040.40  1188.30  1271.50  1295.30
Veal  Estate  254.30  306.60  371.20  614.50  683.40  742.80  768.60  816.50  838.10
Other  44.50  69.60  94.50  147.00  125.40  125.40  123.90  127.60  127.70
Total  246.60  242.30  462.50  849.30  1072.60  1384.80  1917.40  2418.60  3172.90  3897.20  3844.30  4108.80  4198.50  4330.10  4625.50
Sources:  Central  inu*  of  Kemit,  The Kuaaiti  Econ  . in  Ten Years.  Economifr  Report  for  the  Period  1969 - 1979.
Central  Bank of  Kuwait.  The Kuwaiti  Economy,  1980  - 1984.
Central  Sas* of  Kumait,  Ouarterly  Statistical  fullettin  December  1987.
*  Includes  real  estate  and other  for  1973-1978.STATISTICAL  APPENDIX  3
KUWAITI  COERICAL BAKS - ASSETS  AND  LIABILITIES
(in  siltlien  of  KumaIt Diners)
1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  195  1906  1967
ASSETS
Ceah  4.70  5.30  6.10  7.90  10.40  11.30  13.60  17.40  18.80  22.70  24.30  19.70  24.00  25.10  28.20
Slomnces  with  Central  Su*  22.20  52.70  61.10  54.50  260.50  111.40  116.20  106.00  147.50  133.50  72.10  77.00  48.20  49.80  125.70
Central  Banks Bills  '13.50  96.30  155.30  469.70  276.10  226.30  263.10  213.10  7.00
Foreign  Asts  479.10  561.40  616.10  674.90  623.20  1214.20  1407.50  1U0.10  2245.50  2251.00  2301.10  2507.60  2229.60  2179.00  2232.00
Clim  at  Private  Sector  266.30  361.90  506.70  934.30  1238.50  1359.40  2119.30  2471.40  3453.60  4292.50  4752.70  S56S.40  5067.80  51S6.10  5473.50
Otber Assets  31.10  56.30  110.78  137.40  262.10  382.20  621.90  875.90  1578.40  1976.80  2567.90  1710.00  1420.60  1664.80  1977.70  1
a'
LIAOILITIES  C
Sight  Deposits  103.60  117.90  188.60  264.70  339.0  422.00  410.60  418.40  956.90  J57.00  787.60  586.00  565.0  564.80  636.90
ouasi-.on  397.20  521.00  600.90  826.5  1092.70  1351.30  1663.20  2187.80  2652.90  2996.30  3254.20  3563.00  3554.60  3639.60  3796.70
Govermnt  Deposits  50.70  73.20  87.30  71.00  114.90  99.30  139.90  14.90  211.00  393.80  362.50  387.80  385.0  226.60  187.20
Foreign  Liabilities  136.10  143.40  169.00  324.10  419.80  601.50  803.90  1134.30  1264.10  1530.00  1550.40  1560.70  1360.30  1214.00  1205.80
Capital  & Bse  4S.50  S1.00  63.80  b9.20  197.40  218.40  268.60  37.00  411.00  576.90  664.40  823.30  839.90  890.60  999.10
Other  LiablMities  70.30  131.10  191.10  263.50  430.20  S8o.00  1005.70  1406.70  2103.00  2790.20  3375.20  2642.30  2347.30  2743.80  3066.20
Total  Asts  a
Total  Liabilities  803.40  1037.60  1300.70  1639.00  2594.70  3278.$i  4291.90  S649.10  7596.90  9146.20  99.30  M95.90  9053.40  9307.80  9693.90
sources: Ninistry  of  Pltaing,  Central  Statistical  office,  Amum  Statistical  Abstract,  1952, Kmit.
Central  *in  of  Iumit,  Oarterly  Statistical  alletin.  Decr  19?.mSUASUCAL AmPDIX  4
(la  *Lllllen  ef  KatU  DLnrsn)
1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  198  16  1962  1983  1984  19n  19i
8WDC£T  RZVEIRiS  j28  2598  289s  2704  2709  3177  6043  429  2985  25S7  3150  2130  2331
lVESTDEN? INCOME  69  152  S28  329  384  521  88  1744  136  1S57  1289  1154  2493
YOTAL  REVENUES  1tS  2750  3224  3033  3093  3898  923  8043  4349  4224  4439  384  4824
nIaLIC  EMITUa  z7  630  1280  1418  17U4  1750  2378  3118  3538  3501  34"5  3223  3025
Of 
,bch
CURRENT  281  432  8e  741  780  *o1  1247  1483  1745  2001  1928  2071  1977
DEVELOPNM  IIE70  113  204  353  494  4*  423  492  S58  SS2  750  753  171
LAND  PURC.  19  48  147  10S  1U"  107  264  392  449  220  227  138  180
EQUIT  I  LOCAL  62  232  215  175  297  239  21U  850  715  574  547  228  88
COAHPI ES  AND
USULIC  ESnERz  S
Saurce:  CantrlZ.  bank  of  Kuwt.  Goeg,w  r_t  nL-ance Stat&stLie  Yearbook.SASUSlICAL  AP?DX?  5
Kamt'  ra  Goss  Dometi  ?ratbct  at  Orent  PrIces
(in  alluOUS  Of  EinIl  Dr mS)
1973  s197  1973  1976  1977  1978  1979  1og0  1981  190  1983  1984  1  196
1.  O.  secter  994.10  ,020.05 2Ue56.56 2.519.U7  2,677.31 2,  520.55  ,612.54  5,ee6.30 4,114.96 2,763.47 3,037.93 3,400.09 2,983.16  1,841.76
2.  Ik-eUL  Sectoe  610U.0  791.67  1,028.06 1,316.82 1  574.29 1,743.77  2,427.33  2,654.70  2,270.84  3,148.80  3,096.2  29o.U66  2.935.1.  3,156.24
-Arcuulture  &  rIL*  s  4.70  4.69  6.47  7.15  7.68  9.97  11.78  14.07  23.97  28.51  28.44  34.94  39.38  51.94
-NamuaourWL.g  80.20  171.19  197.49  234.24  246.56  287.95  s  69.77  430.20  A20.4  S09.89  378.34  303.18  376.10  55.27
-KlecurLaty.  GCs a  Watet  11.30  U1  64  13.14  1I.75  21.04  24.39  25.91  (73.93)  (16.)  (20.")  (220.")  (175.17)  (150.10)  (94.14)
-coms:KuctLes  44.40  62.76  73.67  122."0  15.40  M75.3  219.U1  278.05  283.0  262.16  273.95  272.24  197.96  156.00
11ele 6 RetaIl  trade  1U.70  140.40  211.30  20.U76  352.4  304.52  410.76  554.05  618.15  714.01  498.36  528.06  499.  470.12
-Transport.  storage  ad
C  m_ catlot  41.00  50.39  60.14  72.44  76.95  69.39  115.41  181.24  214.9  291.35  274.91  2".76  239.56  250.43
-W  'ainala  ItLtutlam  24.20  25.94  39.20  56.91  82.21  102.60  135.74  167.22  218.30  367.56  291.13  277.00  221.80  217.00
-lasace  3.50  3.9u  6.00  0.31  O.U94  l.00  14.44  14.9n  15.00  27.63  18.12  22.8u  19.38  18.67
.Ga,aimat  a  Ot0er  SecYlcas  286.70  319.67  420.65  307.66  610.  658.05  923.  n  1.000.."  1264.o0  1,617.55  1,535.66  1, 45.06  1,469.9  1,532.15
3.  GOP  (1  +  2)  1,601.10  3,811.72  3,484.62  3U,83.49  4,051.60 4,264  3  U  6839.87  7,741.06  6,95.00  6,212.27  6,134.19  6,300.77  5,913.31  4,m.00
1ources:  Central  Bank  of  KmeLt,  7Te KawaItl  2coaoy,  19s0  - 1984.
Central  Bank  of  uwaLt,  Qaerterly  Statistical  NulatLm,  Oat  - Dec.  1967.- 49 -
STATISTICAL  APPENOII  6
I ANNUAL  EQUITY  AND  EARNINGS
OF  KUWAITI  COMMERCIAL  BANKS  1971-87
*~~~~~  S
t  :  t  EOUI tY  I SSUESt 
I  I  ~~~~~  ~~I  E  itITs  IS9U 
t  t  tOAU5  R  ae  g  u  a  r  Net  Profit
I  I  I  Number I  Value  I  Number  Value  I Pruoius  I
Year I Capital  I  Number  of  I  I  I  I  I  I
I  IK0 1'$  I  Shares  I(D  133sI  11KD  l1Usll(KO  3sll)i(Kb  111's)  I
1971  (1)  1  11,413  t  1,455,03  U:  217,511  I  1,631  t  None  I  None I  None I  NA
1971  13,844  U  1,672,531  1  228,51  H1  1,714  t  None  I  None I  None I  NA  I
1972  1  16,758  1  2,131,011  N  255,111  1  1,913  t  None  I  None t  None I  NA 
1973  It  18,673  t  2,356,300  t  39,303  t  293  t  51,118  1  5,  H  I  15,133  3  NA 
1974  It  19,467  I  2,445,600  t  100,130  I  753  318,913  1  3,989  1  7,356  t  NA  I
1975  1  22,617  1  v 2,154,503  1  419,675  1  3,073  t  442,111  1  3,443  t  13,761  t  NI 
1976  I  29,671  I  3,796,175  1  721,235  I  5,439  I  1,619,932  1  13,691  2  64,928  1  11,71  1
1977  (21  1  59,194  t  16,946,262  1  1,363,638  1  13,227  1  None  I  None  I  None  t  16,587  I
1978  (3)  6  69,824  1  69,9824,251  1  7,885,625  2  7,996  I  3,511,113  1  3,511 1  21,533  1  22,372  I
1979  1  91t213  I  81,299,975  t  8,581,376  1  8,581  1  6,601,800  1  6,631  1  33,633  1  27,476
19e9  1  96,299  I  96,397,156  1  12,667,479  1  12,667  t  4,936,734  1  4,918  1 25,554  1  35.313  1
1991  1  113,917  1  113,917,217  I  22,345t255  1  22,045  1  15,511,291  :  15,51l  1  83,529  1  5,749  1
1982  151,484  t  129,953,956  1  38,911,366  t  39,911  1  None  I"  None  I  None 1  68,741  t
1983  I  181,418  1  193,419,219  1  22,469,192  1  22,469  1  24,361,416  2  24,368  1  72,295  1  61.591  1
1984  213,133  I  236,10f,298  t  7,419,272  1  7,419  1  None  I  None I  None 1  64,368  t
1985  1  192,546  1  192,546,321  I  16,792,867  I  16,793  1  None  I  None  .'I  Jone 1  23,903  I
1986  268,177  1  269,176,633  2  24,693,533  I  24,601  1  7,875,111  1  7,975  "  7,875  1  45.969  1
1989  (4)  I  324,966  1  3,241,654,013  I  71,279,111  1  7,928  1  19,444  1  19,444  1  38,888  1  52,5at  :
I  Not including  Dank  Bahrain  I Kuwait
1t  Published  net profit
(1)  Fro&  1971-77  the  par  value  of  shares  for  soot  banks  was  18  KD
(2)  This  year  includes  one  bank  with  shares  of  par  value  I  KD
(3)  Shares  had  been  split:  one  share  of  par  value  7.5  KD  to 7.5  shares  of  par  value  I  KD
14)  Shares  had  been  split:  one  shae  of  par  value  1  KB  to 18 shares  of  par  value  138  fils
Source:  Central  Sank  of  Kuwait.- 50  -
STATISTICAL  APPENDIX  7
KUWAITI  COMMERCIAL  BANK  LOANS  AS OF MARCH  31,  1985
Amount  of Loan  INumber  oflPercent  I  Value  IPercent  lAverage  Loanj
(KD)  i  Loans  I  I  (KD'OOO) I  I  (KD)  l
|  UNDER  20,000  |  44,544  |  90.88 I  110,423  I  2.49 I  2,479  |
20,001  50,000  1,071  I  2.19 I  35,793  I  0.81 I  33,420
50,001  100,000  I  829 I  1.69 I  59,519  I  1.34 I  71,796  1
100,001  250,000  I  991 I  2.02 I  158,284  I  3.57 j  159,721
250,001  500,000  I  577 I  1.18 I  197,697  I  4.45 I  342,629
SO0,O01 1,000,000  350 I  0.71 I  252,210  5  5.68 I  720,600
1,000,001 2,000,000  I  260 I  0.53 I  369,107  j  8.32 I  1,419,642
2,000,001 5,000,000  g  190 I  0.39  5  592,806 I  13.36 I  3,120,032
OVER  5,000,001  I  202 I  0.41 I  2,662,099  t  59.98 I  13,178,708  I
I  TOTAL  I  49,014  100.00  4,437.938  I  100.00  |  l
SO  __RE:Go  _ru  _n  . to  a  1lmt  questLon  15  1 
SOURCE:  Government  reply  to a parliamentary  question  - 1985.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- *  ::s:::s:a  7S:s33337SS333-7-3333  33  33333  - :-  gtS7  3:3,3  :3:  :
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STATISIICAL  AFPEIIDII  9
GIJlF  CO1PANIES
lin  thousands  of  U.S. Dollarsd
1978  979  I  19B1  1  1  991  1  21932  1983  1994
ink Sector  I  I
lFirst  6ulf  Bank  I  1  32,59N.15  N  32,594.11  1  32,59.3S5  1  32.o7.3  9  12.6112.  32.61771
lUnited  6ulf  Sit  1  74,555.N5 174,531.11 12 1611l2.  1  29  2N6,686.65  N  :  Z.1 Bl
Ilahraln  International  Oink  I  I  119  1.794.11  179,194.15 111179,71.16
llahran  Middl  East  Bank  I  2  99,944.5  99.944,19  R  139.944.3N
Investment  Sector  I  2  2
Sharjah  Group  Cospant  17N2  1  02,281.6  N2  8  N2,282.55  I28208.46  1131,6.6 11  299,I62.931  1199132.N51 
Pearl lLo'Lo'a1  Investment  Co.  I  75,2019.1  2  175,N191  21 113,111.5  I  150.N9.BO1  I19,535.66  I  1515.116.s
Gull Financial Centre  I  2  54,4366  1  9  54,465.3  59,954.3  119.111.18  I  I
Arab Interratlonal  Development  Co.  I  6,625.11  I  S,425.1  1  1,959.31 1  29,449,15  N  316,11.65  36,259.41 1
6ull  Investments  Company  1  124,974.651  124,974.81  117,472.10  1  27,94.31  2  2N9,613.50  1  289,932.6 
lArabian  General Investment  Co.  32,454.01 I  32,454.33  2  32,454.59  1  79,2N4.6  I  79,212.72  2  19,217.15
ICoQst  Investment  I  Devevelopeent  Co.  i  I  I  89,633.5  I6  2  ,663."1 2  1  6  5  113,1.3 
Kuwait A Gulf  Financial  Centor  32,636.6N  1  32,61.53  1  3,913.44  "  18,918.44  '
lahrain  International  Investsent Center 2  '  I  1219.163.  '  1225.  N653  2  125.Nl6.83  1
lahraini  Kuvaiti  Inn,stnnt  Group  1  2  1  14,982.21  2  14,982.21  1  14,N82.21
Insurance  Sector  2  2  '  '  '  '  ' 
...  . . I  I  .. I 
UnitNd Insuranco  Coopany  1741  2  2,724.5  N  2,124.35  I  2,724.5  I  2,994.46 I  3296.15  1  3  3294.12  1  1
Gulf  Union Insurance  Co.  2  7,995.  7,5L.3  2  ,74N5.N  19,647.19  1  19,172.3  1  19,172.71  1
Gull  International  Insurance  I  I  I  I  I
Company  Ltd.  JAl Alamial  1  2  11,982.51  11  ,982.95 1  2  ,525.N8  19  33,033.421 51.354.42  1
Arab laternatlonal  Insurance  Co.  I  2  5,997.3  1  5,997.  1  7,49.3  1  7,497.N  1  7,497.65 1
Real  Estate Sector  f  '  2  '  '  2  2  2
................... I II:II
Gulf Investment  and  Real  2  2I  I  I  I  I  2 
Estate Company  16irecol  1771  1  175,177.11  1  175,77.01 1175,717  11 2  292,981.  21  591,11.20  29  591.1BS.95  591,834.4  N
Al  Jaaira  Contract. & Investment  Co.(7812  11,5391.N  2  1410,5.6I  1,591.5 1  11,237.431  2  12,248.70  12  74,343.  1
6ult  Real  Estate Company  I  I  95,341.63  1  95,341.1  1  95,341.87  2  95.341.7  1  95,341.87  2
I  I1  I  I  :.  :  .
Industrial  Sector  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I
..  __  i  I  .......................  I  I  I  I  I  I  .1
Ras  Al-ihaiekh Poultry  I  Fodder  Co.  2  26398O.47  2  24,524.48  24,526.48 2  24,526.4  1  2516.48  "
Gulf Cement  Company  171  I  91,683.1 I  81,483.6  2  61,693.111  1131,2.71  2131,346.45  2  131,47.4  24  131,147.14  2
6ull  Industries Company  (771  1,344.311 2  14,344.1  2  14,344.32  1  24,514.45  1  54,577.85 2  54,629.75  54,429.75  I
Sharish  Cement  * Industrial  I  2  I  2  2  2  I
Dovolopment  Company  Ltd.  '48,18.5  2  48,878.18 2  74,911.47  I131,395.51  1  237,.44.2  I  S7.649.82 
Fujairah Cosent  Industries  47,593.31  47,593.73  1  71,Zt59.5 I  134,38.93  1  134,102.64  136.1621  2
Sult 6roup for  Projects  A Industries  I  15,89.6  9  116,894.21  1  13S6.92.S7  134,262.67  2  91341.8 1
Ajean  Cement  Company  I  6  2  *1.29.11  2  41,291.9  2  61,291.72  I  64.35.76  12  64,39.74  5
lArNi  Iron 1 Steel  Co.  IE.C.)  I  2  t5,3N.5  N  51,613.6  1  227,398.1  I12 5,6  3  64.1  1359,44.  11
t6ult  Petroloum  Products  Co.  1  27N,24.6  1  27,246.53  2 135,212.67  136,212.67  2  153,272.67  I
Ras Al Khaimah  Co. for  Shite Cement  n2  2  2  2
A Construction HMterials  2  I  1  154,905.631  215,95.48  IJ 63,443.23  2  24.314.93  14,314.91 
Mines  & Industry Company  I  2  2  46,981.11 2  44,598.31  46,581.31  44,581.31
Gulf  Consolidated  Cospany  2t  I  I
For Services  I  Industries  I  2  2 166,635.3 1249,244.51  1 49,244.6  149.246.0S  2
6ulf  Clinker Compony  Ras Al  Khaimahl  2  I  2  82,363.26  2  3,115.11 2  153,115.16  1
:  :  I  :  :  2  :  :
Nlscmllanes  Compaies  :  2
United International  Hotels (141  49,251.31  I  49,25.611:  49,253.89  2  z2,13.22 2  54,1091.7  2  61323.82
Gulf Agriculture  Developmnt Co. (7731  2  27,673.62 27,93.67  1  3.132.44 21 54,481.17 54,482.67  54,482.67
Al  Sharquli For Art  Production  I  Dist.  2  2  8,172.1  2  8,172.24  2  19,38.37  2  3  38134.75  2  3.813.75  2  a 181,.75
6ult  Radical  Projects Co.  1  21,77.53  2  27,757.96 2  33,95.6  2  44,625.99  6  44,327.21  1  644,27.21
*_  -_-_-_-__-_--_--  .........  *  - ----------  ---  ---  --------- I-  --- _  ------- *  *  -----------  --- --- I-------------I-------*-------:
TOTALS  410.59.01  2 912,151.13  21,529,595.39  122,116.68.61  24.119,572.65  :4,339,671.24  2  3.421.35.73 
---  ---------- I-----------  --------------------------  -------------  :  :
Kim  Gulf Issues  2  493,492.00  61l,944.39 I  417,5N3.22 12,111,891.45  I  1179,N8111.91  417,771  .541:
.............  ...  ....................... …-------------..-------------  …--------------.I-------------  I-------------…-  ------------- :---…----------
ICoapanios  listed  on the Kuvait Stock Esucingv.
Sourfc: Securities  Group SAK,  Kuwait, 1984, Gulf Companies  Directory.PPR  Working Paper  Series
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